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The objective of this paper is to examine the effect of tax incentives on
investment in  physical capital and in research and development (R&D  hereafter),
and  indirectly on  output and the  demand for labor and materials.  For this
purpose we calculate the effect oZ tax incentives on the rental prices of the
services of physical and knowledge capital, and of these rental prices on both
types of investment.  This paper contains the following  major innovations:  The
first one is the use of rental prices of capital services which are consistent
with rational rather than static expectations on the part of economic agents.
The second one is that we do not take it for granted that the corporate income
tax (CIT  hereafter) and hence  tax incentives enter  the expressions for the  rental
prices of capital services, but test for their presence in these expressions
instead.  Usually in empirical studies of particular industries the assumption
is maintained  that there  is perfect competition, so that the possibility  of
short-run shifting of the CIT does not arise (see  e.g. Shah and Baffes (1991)J.
We  do  not  maintain  this  assumption,  but  test  it  against  the  alternative
assumption that the firms in a given industry may have market power.  If the
firms do not exercise their market power fully at the time of a change in the
CIT, they may try to shift the CIT on to consumers by raising the price of their
output.  Even if they try to shift the tax forward in this manner, they may or
may not succeed completely in doing so.  Instead of ruling out the possibility
of complete short-run forward shifting of the CIT a priori, we test for it, as
will be explained below.  Third, this paper is the first study of its kind for
a developing country.
Empirical literature on the developing countries is completely silent on
this question, while numerous empirical studies  for developed countries have not
resulted in  a consensus among economists about the incidence of the CIT.  Yet it
is very important to find out whether the tax does or does not influence the
rental prices of capital  services.  After all, the rental prices of capital
services are  two of the most important  channels through  which this tax  may or  may
not influence the production and investment decisions of firms.-2-
It is the short-run impaot  effect of the CIT which determines whether the
tax does or does not have an effect on the rental prices of capital services.
This  is a question  for partial  equilibrium analysis.  The  long-run general
equilibrium effects of the tax are quite similar, whether it is shifted in the
short run or not.  The reason for this is that a tax which is fully shifted  E
forward  in the  short run results  in increased prices of  corporate outputs,
therefora reduced quantities  demanded and  produced.  The output effect  of a fully
shifted  CIT causes inputs  to move from  the corporate  to the nor.-corporate  sector,
which is also the output effect of a CIT that was not shifted in the short run
[see Harberger  (1962)].  Only  the  substitution  effzct  of  the  tax  differs,
depending on whether it is shifted in the short run or not.  It will be shown
below that it is  the CIT's substitution effect which determines whether thb tax
enters the expressions for the rental prices of capital services or not.
Pindyck and Rotemberg (1983:1072, footnote 17) commented that the rental
price  of  capital  services  calculated  in  the  tradition  of  Christensen  and
Jorgenson (1969) is not consistent with a rational expectations model, because
it embodies  static expectations.  Here we derive expressions  for the  rental
prices  of  the  services  of  physical  and  knowledge  capital  which  are  fully
consistent with the assumption of rational expectations on the part of economic
agents.  By "rational expectations" we mean that economic agents use all the
information available to them at time s in order to make unbiased forecasts of
the values of economic variables that will prevail at a future time t.
The paper goes on to show that the expressions for the rental prices of
capital services would be free of the parameters of the CIT if the tax were
completely shifted forward in the short run.  The fact that the rental prices of
capital services depend on the absence or presence of complete short-run forward
shifting of the  CIT  is used as  a basis  for non-nested  hypothesis  tests to
determine if the tax was fully ohifted in the industries studied.  (Section 2.
provides details on the taxation of corporate income in Pakistan and Turkey.)
A rational-expectations model was estimated twice:  Once with expressions
for the rental prices of capital services which contain the parameters of the-3-
CIT, the second time with rental prices that are free of tax parameters.  The
econometric model consists of one equation each for the variable inputs labour
and materials, an equation for investment in physical capital, an equation for
R&D expenditures (investment  in knowledge ca,  1 tal), and an output equation.  The
factor demand  equations  and  the  investment  equations  were  obtained  fre..a  a
quadratic approximation to an arbitrary normalized cost function.  Since the
quadratic specification is not invariant to the choice of numeraire, the model
was  estimated  twice, using the  variable  inputs labour and materials  as the
numeraire input in  turn.  Non-nested hypothesis tests (on  non-nested hypothesis
tests see MacKinnon (1983)]  were conducted to test the two pairs of expressions
for the rental prices of capital services against each other.
For all the industries studied and for  both approximations the model using
the rental prices of capital services  without tax parameters was rejected by the
data and the  model using  the rental prices  with tax parameters, whereas the  model
using the rental prices with tax  parameters could  not be rejected by the data and
the  alternative model.  For cur samples we were  thus able to show that the
parameters of the CIT do enter the expressions for  the rental prices of capital
services.  Having established this,  we went on  to calculate  the effect of certain
tax  incentives  on  output,  on  the  demand  for  labour  and materials,  and  on
investment.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows:  Section 2. outlines the
structure of corporate taxation and of investment incentives in Pakistan and
Turkey.  The third section presents the theoretical model, with the details of
derivations given in appendices (1)  to (3).  Appendix (4)  presents the formulae
for the elasticities which were computed, appundix (5)  discusses the method of
estimation  and the non-nested hypothesis tests, while appendix  (6) gives the
sources for  the data and outlines how  the variables  were constructed from  the raw
data.  Section  4.  reports  the  empirical  results,  while  the  last  section
summarizes the paper and comments on the policy implications of its results.-4-
2.  T  Structure of Corgrate  Taxataon and !nvestment Ingentives
2.1  Pakistau
Pakistan has follnwed a  stable corporate tax rate regime since the early
1960s.  The  corporate  income tax at  30%  and a  super tax  at  25% have  been
maintained consistently during the last two decades.  Only in the fiscal year
1989-90 tha super tax rate was brought down to 15%.  Foreign direct investment
receives tax treatment equivalent to domestic investment.  Losses are allowed to
be carried forward six years, but no carryback of such losses is permitted.  A
sales tax  at 12.5% is payable on all domestically manufactured goods by the
producer and on imported goods by the importer.  In the fiscal year 1989-90,
import  duties  at differential  rates were  imposed on  imported machinery  and
equipment.  These rates varied from 20% to 50% if similar machinery was not
manufactured in Pakistan, and a higher rate of 80% applied  to imported machinery
with domestic substitutes.  Businesses  were further subject  to a large number of
miscellaneous licensing fees and charges.
The  regime  of  fiscal  ince:-tives  through  the  corporate  income tax  has
experienced  significant changes over time.  From time to time, Pakistan has
relied upon  a variety  of fiscal  incentives to stimulate  investment.  These
include accelerated capital consumption allowances for certaini  physical assets,
full expensing for R&D investments, tax rebates, regional and industry specific
tax holidays, and investment tax credits.  These are briefly discussed below:
Tax holidayss  Tax holidays for two years for specific industries  (e.g.
engineering  goods)  and  specific regions  (most of  the  country  except  major
metropolitan  areas)  were  introduced  in  1959-60.  The  holiday  period  was
subsequently raised to four  years in 1960-61.  These  tax holidays  were eliminated
in 1972-73 but reinstated again in 1974-75.  Presently tax holidays for five
years are permitted to engineering goods, poultry farming and processing, dairy
farming, cattle or sheep breeding, fish farming, data processing, industries
manufacturing agricultural machinery, and also to all industries in designated
areas of the country.Investment tax credits:  Industries are eligible for varying tax credits
according to location.  A general tax credit for balancing, modernization, and
replacement of plant and equipment was introduced at a  rate of 15%, but  its
application was restricted to designated areas.  Since 1976-77, the credit was
made available regardless of location and type of industry.  This credit was
withdrawn in 1989-90.
Tax  rebates:  Companies exporting  goods  manufactured  in Pakistan  are
entitled to a rebate of 55% of taxes attributable to such sales.
Accelerated capital  consumption  allowances: Capital  consumption  allowances
follow accelerated schedules for  machinery and equipment, transport vehicles and
housing for  workers (25%),  oil exploration equipment (100%), ship building (20-
30%),  and structures (10*)  on a declining balance method.  Expenditures relating
to  research  aad  development,  transfer  and  adaptation  of  technologies  and
royalties are eligible for full expensing.
All  the  pertinent  provisions  of  the  tax  code  including  general  tax
incentives available to the chemical and pharmaceutical industries are embodied
in the rental prices of capital serzizes discussed in the following sections.
2.2  Turkey
Corporate tax base  and rate:  Taxable income  of  corporate entities (defined
as book profits before taxes plus  increases in pension  reserves and general
provision for bad debt minus investment and export allowances and depreciation
deductions  etc.)  is  currently  taxed at  a  f.  at rate  of 46%.  A  3%  defence
surcharge is  payable on this basic rate.  In  addition, a 1%  tax is  payable to the
Social Assistance and Security Fund, arnd  a-  additional 1% tax is levied for the
Apprenticeship,  Vocational  and Training  Encouragement  Fund,  for  a  combined
corporate tax rate of 49.38% . Corporate tax is withheld at source at varying
rates with 0% rates for dividend distributions, 5% for income from crude oil
exploration, 10% on interest and moveable property income, 20% for income from
immoaable  property, and 25% for salaries and wages and patents and royalties.-6-
Inventory valuationt  Inventories  must be valued for  tax purposes at their
actuial  historical costs with no adjustment for inflation.  If cost cannot be
determined on  an  ind:vidual  bBisis,  a moving average determination is acceptable.
Capital gains:  Capital gains and losses are included in  the determination
of taxable income.
Dividend distributions:  Dividend  distributions and intercompany dividends
are not taxed.
Depreciation deductions:  Depreciation allo.wances  are based on historical
costs adjusted by the wholesale price index  minus 10% and take the form of ten-
year interest bearing bonds.  Either the  straight-line or declining balance
method of  depreciation may be chosen for any asset,  but no switch is allowed from
the straight-line to the declining balance method during the life of the asset.
Depreciation on moveable fixed assets acquired on or after January 1, 1983 may
be taken under a straight-line method at any rate chosen by the tax payer, up to
an annual maximum of 25%.  If the declining balance method is  used, the maximum
allowable depreciation rate is 50%.  Assets having values less  than 5,000  TL can
be deducted.  For structures and moveable fixed assets acquired before January
1, 1983, the Ministry of Finance publishes maximum  depreciation rates  (on a
straight-lino  basis) permissible for  tax purposes.  These rates typically are 4%
for factory  buildings, 15% - 20% for  transport equipment, and 12.5% for  machinery
and equipment.
Other  taxes:  A value-added  tax  is levied at  a general  rate  of  10%.
Banking and insurance transactions are subject to a 3% tax (BITT).
Investment incentives:
Several  incentives for  investment are available  through the tax  code.
These are discussed below:
a. Investment Incentive Allowance
The investment incentive allowance is a deduction from  the taxable income
for corporate tax purposes.  The deduction is claimed in the year of investment
on that portion of investment which is not subsidized by the government.  Unused-7-
investment  allowances  can  be  carried  forward  indefinitely.  The  rate  of
investment allowance varies by region and type of investment as followes
Region:
Developed regions  30%
Normal regions  40%
Second priority regions  60%
First priority regions  100%








Scientific research and development  100%
b.  Special Incentives for Scientific R&D:
In  addition to the 100% investment  allowance, the following incentives for
R&D are also available:
i.  Tax postponement:  20% of the amount of corporate tax may be spread
in nine equal instalments without interest to three years following the year in
tihich  the research and development expenditure is  made, provided that the tax so
postponed  should  not  exceed  the  amount  of  such  expenditures  made  in  the
corresponding year.
ii.  Tax  exempt status for  corporations carrying  out scientific  research  .Id
development:  Effective January  1, 1986,  corporations  carrying out  sciesztific  R&D
can apply for tax exempt status.
c. Investment Finance Fund
Corporations  can  set  aside  up  to  25%  of  taxable  income  for  future
investments.  The amount  set aside at the discretion  of the corporation  is-8"
deducted  from its  taxable  income  and  d&posited  in an interest  bearing  account
(earning  the  same  intereet  as  goverament  bonds,  usually  about  20%  p.a.)  with  the
Central  Bank.  It can  be withdrawn  any time  with authorization  from  the State
Planning  Office  and  used for  investment.
d.  Real  Estate  Tax  Exemption
For  investments  qualifying  for  investment  allowances,  real  estate  taxee  are
waived  foc  several  years.
e.  Accelsi:ated  Capital  Consumption  Allowances
As discussed  earlier,  accelerated  depreciations  up to a limit  of 50%  can
be claimed  for  machinery  and  equipment. Further  assets  can  be revalued  at the
end  of every  calendar  year.
f.  Customs  Exemption
Machinery  that embodies  new technology  and improves  the international
competitiveness  of  Turkish  industries  can  be imported  free  of customs  duties.
g. Export  Allowance
If a company  exports  industrial  goods  for  more than  US$250,000  per year,
it can take a 20% deduction  of its profits  realized  on the exports.  It the
exporter  is not  the  manufacturer-of  the  goods,  only  a 5% exemption  applies.
h.  Non-tax  Incentives
A  large  number  of  non-tax  incentives  are  available  to  eligible  investments.
These include low interest  credit,  funds for working capital,  allocation  of
foreign  exchange,  and  allowance  for  import  of used  equipment.
All the pertinent  provisions  of the tax code  are  embodied  in the rental
prices  of capital  services  discussed  in  the following  sections.-9-
3.  T-.  Teor  a  od-el
3.1  xItr9dutjon
Two of the main channels  through  which  tax incentive.  influence the
decisions  of firms  are the rental  prices  of capital  services.  Increased  tax
incentives  and  lower  rental  prices  of  capital  services  are  expected  to otihulate
investment.  Therefore it  is  important to use the correct  expressions for the
rental  prices  of capital  services. This  paper  derives  the  expressions  for  the
rental  prices  of  the  services  from  physical  and  knowledge  capital  from  a  rational
expectations  model,  which makes  them f4lly  consistent  with the assumptiorn  of
rational  expectations  on the  part of  economic  agents.
Before  determining  the effect  of tax incentives  on the rental  prices  of
capital  services,  it  is  impo_tant  to  consider  another  question:  What  would  be  the
consequence  if  the  firms  in  a  given  industry  succeeded  completely  in  shifting  the
CIT  forward  to coisumers  by changing  the  price  of  output  in  response  to a  change
in  the rate  of the  CIT?
In a perfectly  competitive  industry  short-run  tax shifting,  leave  apart
complete  shifting,  is  of  course  impossible.  Harberger  (1962)  made  the  assumption
of perfect  competition  when analyzing  the general  equilibrium  effects  of tile
movement  of  capital  from  the  corporate  to  the  non-corporate  sector  because  of  a
change  in  the  CIT.  These  capital  movements  result  from  the changed  after-tax
rate  of return  on coxporate  capital  in  response  to a change  in  the  CIT.  Short-
run  forward  shifting  of  the  CIT  is  not  possible  either  in  an  industry  where  firms
have  some  degrue  of  market  power,  but  are  exercising  this  market  power  fully  in
order  to  maximize  their  short-run  profits.
But  there  may  be  industries  in  which  firms  maximize  long-run  rather  than
short-run  profits  and  therefors  do not  exert  their  market  power  fully  prior  to
a  change  in  the  CIT.  In  such  an  industry  the  firms  might  be  able  to  shift  the
CIT forward  completely,  so  that  their  after-tax  profits  would  bo the  same  an
their  profits  in  the  absence  of  the  tax  change. In  that  case  there  would  be  no
reason  for  capital  to leave  the  corporr  e sector,  and  the  Harberger  model  would
not  apply.  It is more likely  that firms  with  unexerted  market  power  would  try- 10  -
to shift  the CIT forward,  but  would succeed  only partially in  doing so.  However,
instead  of ruling out the possibility of complete tax shifting a  priori, we test
for the absence or presence of complete short-run tax shifting.  We show that a
fully shifted CIT would have no effect on the rental prices of the services from
physical and knowledgw capital, so that tax incentives  would be ineffective.  It
is therefore of great policy relevance to find out whether complete short-run
forward shifting of the CIT is as rare in  practice as one would expect it to be
a priori.  .. his needs t, be done for individual industries rather than for the
manufacturing sector  as  a  whole, because  the preconditions for  complete short-run
forward shifting of the tax, namely unexerted market power, may well be present
in  some industries, but absent in  others.  Since knowing the impact effect of the
CIT is so important for policy makers, this topic deserves more attention than
it has received so far.
3.2  The rental prices of capital services with partial or no short-run
forward &hifting of the CIT
Complete short-run forward shifting of the CIT may be itmpossible  for a
number of different reasons:  The  firms of  an industry may be price takers in
their output markets.  They  may have  market power, but  engage in short-run profit
maximization.  The firms may have some unexerted market power at the time of the
tax change, but not enough to be able to pass  the CIT on  to consumers completely.
All these models have in common  that a change in  the CIT  will result in after-tax
profits which are lower than profits prior to the tax change.  The simplest and
therefore most frequently made assumption is that there is perfect competition
in an industry.  That is the assumption we are going to make in this section.
But the expressions for the rental prices of capital services would be the same
under any of the  other assumptions about market  structure and  firm behavior
mentioned above.
The assumption of rational expectations  implies that firms view future
prices and quantities as realizations of stochastic variables.  Based on the
information available  to them at  the  present time s, they form  expectations about- 11  -
prices  and quantities at the times t,  t  X  s, s+l,  ...  x.  For example, the
notation e8{I} refers to the mathematical expectation of Kt,  conditional on A,
the set of information available at time  s.  The subjective expectations of
economic agents are assumed to be equal to this mathematical expectation e{Kt}.
The  general  model  presented  here  encompasses  the  models  we  actually
estimated as three special cases.  We point out the differences between these
special cases whenever appropriate.
The firm is assumed to maximize the expected value of the stream of its
discounted future  dividends in  excess of the opportunity cost of equity capital,
i.e. its  expected net present value.  The firm's objective function is  therefore
given by:
Go  2
(1)  v=  es  D,,,{  (Pye)  (Ye)  - E  (W,,)  (V,)  - (It.p.a)  (A)  - (up)  (4)
(Pde)  (IXp)  - (Pkt)  (Ik)  + DAt-,  - CITPC}
Discrete  rather  than  continuous  time  is  used  in  this model.  Therefore the
net  present value of the firm is  a sum rather than an  integral, and the discount
factor is DstD
1  =1  =  1-
rather  than  a 5 (r+7)t  =  eit.  Here  r8 j,  is,t  and  ir5,t  denote  the  real  interest  rate,
nominal  interest  rate  and  rate  of  inflation  which  prevail between the current
time  period s  and  the future time period t.  The other variables in  the equation
for  the expected net present value of the firm are defined as follows, where the
time subscript has been omitted from some of the variables for ease of notation:
Pyt  =  (pyt)(1  +  rot)  price of output in  nominal terms
Pyt ' real price of output
Y  D  quantity of output- 12 -
WJt  =  (wit)  (I  +  rot)  =  nominal  price  of variable  input  J, j  =  L,M
Wjt  real price of variable input j
Vj  5  quantity  of variable  input  j
A  - firm's  debt  +  equity
a  - average  time  period  for  which  A is  outstanding  at time t
up  - property tax rate
KDll  assessed  value of those of the firm's  physical assets which are
subject  to the  property  tax.  It is assumed  here that assessment  of
properties  takes  place  at infrequent  intervals,  so that  the assessed
value  K  is independent  of the firm's  true stock of  physical
capital  K, and  of its  physical  capital  stock  K  for  the  purposes  of
the  CIT.
Ppt  (ppt)( 1 +  wot)  nominal  price  of physical  investment  goods
pot =  real price of physical investment goods
Pkt(  (pt)(1  +  rot)  nominal  price  of expenditures  on R&D
pb  =  real  price  of expenditures  on R&D
Ip  =  amount of gross investment in physical capital
Ik  =  amount  of gross  investment  in  knowledge  capital,  i.e.  amount  of R&D
DAt+  I=  At+ - At  =  new debt and equity issued  during period t
CITPt  =  corporate  income  tax  payments  at time  t, defined  by:
2
CITP,  (u<,) [(Py 7 )  (Yt)  - E  (WI,)  (vj,)  - (be)  (it,  t+)  (At)  - (up,) (JCt)
J1
(kC)  (Pd)  (4)k-  (apt)  (ppe)  (KP)  - (qkt)  (Pke)  (Ikt)
^  (q,')  (P'P)  ('Pt)  J  - (m,P) (P,Pt) (IZt),  where:- 13 -
UC  statutory  rate  of the  CIT
b  - ratio  of debt  to the  sum  of debt  and  equity  A
ak  =  rate  of depreciation  of knowledge  capital  allowed  by the  CIT in
Turkey
ap  =  rate  of depreciation  of physical  capital  allowed  by the CIT in
Pakistan  as well as in  Turkey
K;  =  stock  of knowledje  capital  for  the  purposes  of the  CIT,  relevant
only  for  Turkey
K;  =  physical  capital  stock  for  the  purposes  of the CIT,  relevant  for
both countries
qk  =  proportion  of R&D expenditures  which firms are allowed  to expense,
i.e. to deduct from revenue in the year in which they have been
incurred,  in  both countries
op  =  proportion of investment in physical capital which firms are
allowed  to expense,  only in  Turkey
mp  =  rate  of tax  credit  granted  by the CIT  for  investment  in  physical
capital,  only  in Pakistan
We estimated  three  different  models,  which  are  special  cases  of the  above
general model.  Our Turkish sample consists  of the chemical  and petroleum
derivatives  industries.  For Pakistan  we have two samples:  the larger  one
contains  data  for  the  chemical  and  pharmaceutical  industries,  the  smaller  one  is
limited  to one industry,  the  textile  industry. For our two larger  samples  we
were able  to estimate  the  complete  model,  although  the  different  tax  structures
of the two countries  made two separate  modelo necessary.  For the Pakistani
textile  industry  we were able  to include  only  one of the  two  capital  stocks  in
the  model,  since  this  sample  is  too  small  for  the  number  of  parameters  which  have
to be estimated  for  the complete  model.  Therefore,  for  the Pakistani  textile- 14 -
industry we  have  Ikt  Kkt  =  Pkt=  K  =  0, where  Kkt  is the  true  stock of
knowledge capital at  the beginning of period t.
The firm's production function is given by:
(2)  Yt  =  Yt(vit'  Kpt,  Kk, Ipt'  Ia,  t),
where Yt  is the quantity of output, vji  is a (lx2)-vector of variable inputs, Kp,
is the true stock of physical capital at the beginning of period t, and time t
as usual serves as a proxy for technological change.  The production function
indicates that output Y depends on  the variable inputs vj,  on the quasi-fixed
inputs Kp and Kk,  on technological change, and on gross investment in physical
and knowledge capital.  The fact that both kinds of investment are arguments in
the production  function  implies the assumption that the  firm  is  subject  to
internal,  non-separable adjustment  costs caused  by investment  in  physical as  well
as knowledge capital.  [See Treadway  (1970) and (1974) on the desirability of
specifying adjustment costs as internal and non-separable.]
It is assumed that lenders do not allow the firm's dividends in excess of
the cost of equity capital to be greater than its after-tax economic profits.
This condition is represented by the following inequality:
2
(3)  (Pyt)  (Yt)  - E  (Wjg)  (V,)  - (i,,c+a)  (At)  - (up,)  (e.)  - (P'p)  (I'p)  -
2
(Pke)  (Ike)  +  DAt.,  - CITP,  :  (Py,)  (Yt)  - E  (W,,) (Vj,)  - (It.t,a)  (A,)
j=1
- (Upd) ( 4 t)  - 8,(P(d)  (Kt)  - 6k(Pk*)  (Kkt)  -CTPt,
where  ip  =  economic rate of depreciation of physical capital,
Sk  =  economic rate of depreciation of knowledge capital.
Since  optimality requires this  inequality to be strictly  binding  [see
Boadway  and Bruce  (1979)], it can be re-written  as the  following borrowing
constraint (after some simplifications, see appendix (1)l:
(4)  DAt+i =  (Ppt+ 1 )(Kpi+ 1)  - (Ppt)(Kpt)  +  (Pkt+ 1) (Kkt+)  - (Pkt)  (Kkt)- 15  -
Appendix  (2)  derives  the following  investment  equation  in terms of the
stock  of physical  capital K;  and  the  rate  of depreciation  ap  for  purposes  of
the  CIT:
(5)  (Ppe)  (Iot)  - (atpt)  (P'pt) (K;c)  +  (Potl  (K-c.1)  - (P  t)  (Kt)
The following  investment  constraint  for  physical  capital  is obtained  by
substituting  the  sum  of replacement  investment  and  net  investment  into  the  left-
hand side  of (5):
(6)  5p(Ppe)  (Kpt,)  +  (Pp,.,)  (Kp,e.i)  - (Ppe) (Kpc)  =  (cpc)  (Ppt)  (Kpt)  +
An analogous  investment  constraint  for  knowledge  capital  is given  by:
(7)  jk(Pjtc)  (J4t)  +  (Pk,.,)  (Kk,.,)  - (Pst)  (Kkt)  =  (kt)  (Pk,)  ('kZ,)  +
(PktV 1)  (4t+I) - (Pkt)  (4Kkt)
Substituting  for gross investment  in physical  and knowledge  capital  in
objective  function  (1), augmenting  it by production  function  (2),  borrowing
constra.'nt  (4)  and  investment  constraints  (6)  and  (7),  one  obtains  the  following
Lagrangean:
2
(8)  L  e 0E  D,,t{  (Pyt)  (Yt)  - E  (Wj,)  (vj,)  - (it,..a)  (At)  - (uWp)  (p*t)
t=g  j.1
- ,p(P,p)  (Kpt)  - (Ppt.2)  (Kxpt.)  +  (Ppt)  (Kpt)
-
8 k(Pkt)  (K  - (Pkt-d  (Kkt.l)  +  (Pkt)  (Kt)  +  DAt  - CITPt
- k3  f Ye  - Y.  (Vj,,  Kpo,  Kktk  XpC  gk,t  t)]
- k 2 [DAc,l  - (Ppt+.)  (K,pc.)  +  (Ppt)  (Rlo)  - (Jkcv1)  (Rktv,)  +(!kc)  (Kkc)]
- k1 [8.(P'p)  (Kot)  +  (Ppt. 1)  (Kpe,)  (Ppt)  (K,pt)  - (apt)  (P  (K)
-(Pptl)  (Kpft.1)  + (Ppt)(Kpt)] 
k4 Iak(PkC)  (Kkt)  +  (Pkrd  (4kt-d)  (P,)  (Kkt)  (akt)  (PkF) (Rkt)
k(P,te)  (4K.t)  +  (Pkt)  (Rkt)  ]}
where  kl  to k4 are  Lagrangean  multipliers.- 16 -
It is  convenient to think of the firm's  optimization problem as consisting
of three separate decisions, although in practice these decisions may well be
taken simultaneously.  The first step is to chose the least-cost combination of
inputs, given a specific quantity of output, and given the existing stocks of
physical  and knowledge  capital.  The next  step is to determine  the optimal
quantity of output, still assuming the capital stocks to be constant.  At the
final stage of the decision making process the firm chooses the optimal rates of
change of  its stocks of physical and knowledge capital.
The  optimal  input  quantities  vj  are  found  as  follows:  At  time  t
Lagrangean (8) is  differentiated partially with respect to inputs  vl and v 2t,  the
derivatives are set  equal to zero and  the first  equation is divided by the second
one.  Since at time t the variables of the same  period are known with certainty,
the expectations operator is unnecessary, and the discount factor
D,t  - 1.  Therefore  we  get  the  well-known  result  wlt/w2t  =  MPPI/MPP 2,  where MPP
stands  for marginal  physical product.  This equation implicitly defines the
optimal input quantities as functions of the following variables:
(9)  v=  (Wjc,  YYc  K,pt,  Kk,  Ip',  Ikt  t)
Then the minimum variable cost functions in real and in nominal terms are
given by:
2
(10)  l  (et)  (Wj,)  = gt  w..,  Y,  Kpt, Kkt, Ipt, I*C,  t)  and
j=l
2
(11)  E  (v  ')  (Wy,) = et(COt  Ye,  Rtn  Kke, 
1 pte  k  t)  =  (1  +  'o.C)  (g9)
J=1
The  cost  function  is  increasing,  continuous,  concave  and  linearly
homogeneous  in the two  input prices,  increasing in output  and decreasing  in
investment in  physical and knowledge capital.  From duality theory we know that
the cost function incorporates  all  the information  about  the firm's  technological- 17  -
structure  which is contained  in its production  function.  In particular,  the
presence  of Ip,  and Ikt  as arguments  in (10)  and (11)  indicates  that  the firm  is
subject  to internal,  non-separable  adjustment  costs. After  the  cost  function  has
been incorporated  into Lagrangean  (8),  the production  function  is no longer
necessary  as a separate  constraint.
The next stage of the optimization  process is to choose the optimal
quantity Y*  of  output. Differentiating  the  Lagrangean  partially  with  respect
to Yt  and setting  the  derivative  equal  to zero,  we obtain  the following  first-
order  condition,  in  which  again  all  variables  are  known  with  certainty,  and  the
discount  factor  D,t  =  1:
(12) (T,t)  (Pyt)  - 0Tad  =,  where  T 0 t  3  I  - Uct
Dividing  both sides  of (12)  by T.t  results  in  the  well-known  first-order
condition  P =  MC.
Equation  (12)  implicitly  defines  optimal  output  Y#  as a function  of  the
price  of output  and  of the  variables  which  determine  the  minimum  variable  cost
function:
(13)  Yt: = ?  (Pyt,  W.ti  Kpt,  Kkt,  IPt*  ZkC# t)
The final step is  to determine  the firm's  optimal stocks of physical
capital  K4  and of  knowledge capital  K  for the  time period  (t+l).
Incorporating  the cost function  and the optimal level of output  Y  into
Lagrangean  (8)  and  combining  terms,  the latter  becomes:- 18  -
co
(14)  L  e  E  e  D.  {T,a  t(Pyt)  (Y#())  - G#()  - (bt)  (it,tC,)  (A,)  (upt)  (K4,)
t=S
- (I  - b7) ('e  t.a)  (A,)  +  DA,  - +  (u,,)  (akt)  (.Ptt)  (kc)
+(U,t)  (apt)  (Pvt)  (Kpt)
[  (1  (unt)  (qkt)  I  I  (6k)  (PkV)  (Kke)  +  (Pkt.i)  (Kkt,i)  - (Pkt)  (Ktt)  1
[-(U,,)  (5tp,)  - (mpr)  ][(8p)  (Ppt)  (Kpe)  + (Ppe.-)  (K  p  tl  (  PC¢  xK¢
- k2  [DAt,i  - (Ppe. 1)  (Kp,..,)  +  (Pp,)  (Kpt)  - (Pek.,)  (Kkt+i)  +  (Pkt)  (Kke)  1
- ka(Sk(Pke)  (Kpt)  +  (§~pt.1)  (Apt,)  - (Ppt)  (Kkt)  - (apt)  (Ppt)  ( 4 t)
- (Ppt,e)  (JtSt.I)  +  (Ppt)  (CX  I
k4  [8k(Pkd)  (Kkt)  +  (Pkt-+  -t-1)  (Pkt)  (Kkl)  (aekt)  (Pkt)  (Kkt)
(2kv)(Ktl  +  (Pkt)  (Kkt)]}
Differentiating  (14) with respect to the  control variables At+,,
Kkl  +i and Kk+i, setting the derivatives equal to zero and solving the
resulting system of equations, yields the following two optimality conditions
(for  details of these calculations see appendix (3)]:
(15  1-1  Tta<''  ___  _tTt.,  (.  +  =r,.eta:
(115  e,(T-Ml,  I  - [  T{  :  ag#$  _  (1  -8-)  agi-,)  =
(l%  s)et(p,Pti- 1I  pt  +  ________  t'li  et{m,t+l}  - e  ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~(,)  (1-8,)  {tp
t~~~  ~~  Ctl  r,  tv  t~  f  Tvl,
(1+7Ct'C+  et  Ppt+i)  (q,t)  (Uct)  +  (1-8,)  etf(pt+i  let(  }  ee{  uct
et(pPt+ 1I  (1  Ut,t+  +  8P) et{apt+lIet{UW1+l}
et(TCt.il  (1+lrt  t+l)  (it,t,  + etfapt. 1))
(16)  -l  e  {  -gt  e  __  _  T  _t  ago, +  (1  -8k)  e  gt, 1
1+rt,,F  {t  )t-  et{TCtil  alla  (1  +t,t  t1  aflI)1
(Qk(  [{t,e)(  - et+k*det1uct+I))  + 6*1
(1  +79t.  to1)  Ot  Pkt-1  (q  1  +8,k)  et {  kt+j,  et  (qk,i-}  et  (u.., 1 )
- CC{Pk+t.)  e,e*1  +  k)  (Uct  +  k  lrt 1 e  +  et(U  ,, 1)
_O  (ePkt+l} (t,  t.I  + 8k)  et  'akt-l}  el  {Uct-l
et  f TCt-1)  (  +re  t-l)  (4,  tv2  +  eC { Okt-l} I- 19  -
The  left-hand side of  (15) represents the expected discounted marginal
benefit  from increasing the stock of physical capital, reduced by adjustment
costs incurred in  the current  period, but increased  by the adjustment costs saved
in the next period by investing in the current period instead.  In short, the
left-hand side of the optimality condition represents the expected discounted
after-tax net marginal beaefit from increasing the stock of physical capital.
The right-hand side of  (15) represents the rental price of the services from
physioal capital in the absence of full shifting of the CIT, denoted rppt(tax).
The stock of physical capital Kp+,  for  the next period is chosen optimally if  the
expected discounted after-tax net marginal benefit from investment in physical
capital is equal to rp (tax), the rental price of the services from physical
capital.
The  Turkish CIT does  not  give an investment  credit for  physical investment.
Therefore the terms involving mp,  and mp,+,  on the right-hand side of  (15) are
equal to zero.  In Pakistan, on the other hand, the CIT does not allow any part
of  investment  expenditures  to  be  expensed,  so that  for Pakistan  the  terms
containing qpt  and qg,P,  vanish.
The left-hand side of (16) represents the expected discounted after-tax
marginal  benefit  from  increasing the stock of  knowledge capital  net of the
adjustment costs incurred by engaging in research and development.  The right-
hand side of  (16) represents the rental price of the services from knowledge
capital  in the  absence of  full shifting  of the  CIT, denoted rpkt(tax).  The
capital  stock Kkt+l  for the  next period  is chosen optimally  if the  expected
discounted after-tax net marginal benefit from investment in knowledge capital
is equal to rpk(tax), the rental price of the services from knowledge capital.
In Pakistan the CIT does not allow accelerated depreciation for knowledge
capital, akt+l  is equal to zero, and the last term on the right-hand side of (16)
vanishes.  Since the model of  the Pakistani  textile industry  contains neither R&D
nor knowledge capital, eo.iation  (16) is irrelevant for that model.- 20 -
The rental prices of capital services defined by (15)  and (16) are fully
consistent with rational expectations on the part of economic agents.  They are
forward looking in the sense that they take into account not only the current
parameters  of  the CIT, but  those  for the  next period  as well.  Optimality
conditions  (15) and  (16) also  incorporate the  effect  of  investment  in the
following period, which in turn is partly determined by the tax parameters for
the next period and the one after that.  In this way (15) and (16) indirectly
link all future time periods to the present investment decision.
It is  worth  noting that the expected  average cost of  debt and equity
capital  et{it 1 t+ 1 +,a}  occurs  in the  expressions  for the  rental prices  of tne
services  from  physical  and  knowledge  capital.  Whi.le  the  current  rate  of
inflation has no effect on the rental prices of capital services, the rate of
inflation expected to prevail over the average lifetime of the dominant firm's
debt and equity capital at time t+l does influence the rental prices of capital
services.  By increasing these rental prices, expected future inflation reduces
the firm's optimal stocks of physical and knowledge capital.
Inspection  of  equation  (15) shows  that  an  increase  in  this  period's
investment tax credit rap  has the effect of reducing the rental price of the
services from physical  capital, while an expected increase  in mpt+i,  the tax
credit for the next period,  increases this rental price, other things being
equal.  Similarly, an increase in  this period's investment allowance qpt  has the
effect of reducing the rental price of the services from  physical capital, which
is presumably  the  effect  intended  by  policy makers.  Increased  investment
allowances expected for the next period, on the other hand, raise the rental
price of the services from physical capital ceteris paribus.  It does make sense
that firms face a higher rental price of capital services and hence invest less
during  the  current  period  if  they  expect  the  tax  climate  to  become  more
favourable to them in the next period.
Inspection of equation (16)  reveals that, in general, a small increase in
the fraction qkt  of a firm's expenditures on R&D which it is allowed to treat as
expenses, reduces  the  rental  price of  the  services from  knowledge  capital,- 21 -
presumably  the  effect  intended  by  policy  makers. An expected  increase  of qk+ 1,
the allowed  rate of expensing  of R&D expenditures  for the next time period,
increases  the  rental  price  of the  services  from  knowledge  capital,  which  agrees
with  intuition.  In  the  case  of  Pakistan,  however,  firms  are  allowed  to  treat  the
full amount  of R&D as expenditures  in the year in which they are incurred.
Therefore  qa =  1, and it cannot  be increased  beyond  1.  To examine  the effect
of  full  expensing  of  R&D  expenditures,  we have  to  ask  therefore  what  would  happen
if qk were reduced  by a small amount.  As equation (16) shows,  this would
increase  the rental price of the service_  from knowledge  capital.  If the
expected  rate  of expensing  qkt+l  were reduced,  however,  the rental  price  of the
services  from  knowledge  capital  would  fall.
It is easy to show (by differentiating  the right-hand side of  (15)
partially  with respect  to et{apt+j)  and  the  right-hand  side  of (16)  with respect
to eta,{,+ 1}1 that an increase  in the expected  rate of accelerated  depreciation
will reduce the rental  prices of the services  from physical  and knowledge
capital,  which  will  stimulate  investment  in  both  types  of capital. This  agrees
with  what intuition  predicts.
In this  section  the  assumption  was  made  that  the  firm  is  not  able  to pass
the burden  of the CIT on to consumers  by increasing  the price  of its output.
Under  this  assumption  the  CIT  initially  reduces  thd  firm's  after-tax  profit,  and
capital leaves the corporate for the non-corporate  sector, as analyzed in
Harberger  (1962). In the next section  the assumption  will be made that full
short-run  forward  shifting  of the  CIT  does  take  place,  i.e.  that firms  succeed
in  raising  the  prices  of  their  outputs  in  such  a  way  that  their  after-tax  profits
are  equal  to their  profits  prior  to  the  tax  change. In  that  case  there  would  be
no incentive  for  capital  to  move  from  the  corporate  to  the  non-corporate  sector
because  of lower  after-tax  profits  (substitution  effect). But  even  then  the  CIT
would  have  an  output  effect,  since  higher  output  prices  would  be accompanied  by
lower  quantities  of  output,  so  that  the  corporate  sector's  demand  for  all  factors
of  production,  including  capital,  would  fall. That  is  why  th.e  long-run,  general
equilibrium  effects  of che  CIT  are  quite  similar  in  the absence  or presence  of- 22 -
complete short-run forward shifting  of the tax.  But it  will be shown in  the next
section that the expressions for the rental prices of physical and knowledge
capital differ depending on the impact effect of the CIT on after-tax profits,
and that the impact effect in  turn depends on whether the tax is or is  not fully
shifted forward in the short run.
To some readers it may seem obvious that a fully shifted CIT, i.e. one
which leaves after-tax  profits at the level of profits in  the absence of the tax
(change), will not have any effect on the rental prices of capital services.
Such  readers  may  want  to  omit  the  following  section.  However,  what  is
intuitively obvious to some may be difficult to accept for others.  Besides, if
the  connection  between  full short-run  forward  shifting  of the  CIT  and  the
exr-essions for  the rental prices of capital services  were perfectly obvious, it
would surely have  been mentioned in  the literature by now.  To our knowledge such
a connection has never been made.  That is why in section 3.3 a rigorous proof
is given that a fully shifted CIT has no  effect on the rental prices of the
services from physical or knowledge capital.
3.3  The user cost of capital when com2lete short-run forward shiftino of the
CIT is assumed
Complete short-run forward shifting of the CIT is possible only if the
firms of  a particular  industry have market power,  and  if they do not  fully
exercise their market power prior to a change in  the CIT.  Unexerted market power
may exist for a variety of reasons.  Here the assumption is made that prior to
the tax change a dominant firm (or  group of  dominant firms acting as if  they were
one firm) trades  off higher short-run profit  for a larger market  share and
therefore produces more than the output at which short-run profit is maximized.
There are reasons other than limit pricing why a firm may not want to exert its
market power to the fullest possible extent.  Limit pricing is assumed here not
because it is likely to be a widespread practice, but because it can be most
easily incorporated into an intertemporal  optimization framework.  The effect of
complete short-run forward shifting of the CIT on the rental prices of capital- 23 -
services is the same, regardless of the conditions which make full tax shifting
possible.
We first examine the c&se of a limit pricing firm in the absence of the
CIT.  The purpose of that discussion is to demonstrate that the optimal output
of a firm  which practises limit  pricing in  order to  maximize its long-run  profits
is larger than the optimal output of a firm which maximizes short-run profits.
For such a firm there is scope for a reduction in  output, therefore, in response
to the imposition of the CIT.  In the second part of this section we derive the
rental prices of capital services under the assumption that the CIT is shifted
forward completely in the short run.
In the absence of the CIT the  firm's net present value is obtained by
setting CITP=  0  in equation  (1) above.  We  number this objective  function
without CIT-payments equation (1').  Industry demand Yl  is assumed to depend on
income  X  and  the  prace Py.of  substitute  goods. By  definition, industry  demand Yt
is the sum of the demand Y,  for the output of the dominant firm, and of the
demand Rt  for the output of rival firms:
(17)  Y(X, P 5) = Yc  + Rt
If RN  is equal to zero,  the dominant firm practices limit pricing in order
to deter entry by potential rivals.  If Rt  is  positive, the firm  practices limit
pricing in  order to prevent the output of the industry's competitive fringe from
growing faster  than is  optimal from the point of view of the dominant firm.  The
dominant firm is assumed to be subject to the following entry constraint at the
time of the change in the CIT:
(18) DRMt.  ( = Re.,  - Re)  = cc(t - Yr)
where  Y4  is that output of the dominant firm at which there is no change in
the output Jt  of rival firms, and ct  a 0 is a reaction coefficient.  A similar
constraint  can be  found in Gaskins  Jr.  (1971), except that there continuous- 24 -
rather  than  discrete  time  was  used,  and  a  non-entry  price  rather  than  a  non-entry
output.  This  entry constraint  implies  that the output  of rival firms will
increase  if the dominant  firm reduces  its own output  Yt  below the non-entry
output  Yt *  Production  function  (2)  and  borrowing  constraint  (4)  are  the  same
as above.  The  derivation  of the  minimum  variable  cost function  (11)  proceeds
exactly  as in  section  3.2  above,  so  there  is no need  to repeat  it here.
We incorporate  minimum  variable  cost  function  (11)  into  objective  function
(1'),  augment  it  by  borrowing  constraint  (4)  and  entry  constraint  (18),  thereby
obtaining  the following  Lagrangean:
co
(19)  L  e,,  D9.c  (Pyt)  (YC) - G:()  - (iU, C.)  (At)  - (u,,)  (&)
t=s
(Ppd)  (IXt)  - (Pkt)  (IkC)  +
- 2 [DAt,1 - (ptv,)  (ICpt,)  +  (P,pe) (KR)  - (Pkcl)  (Kui)  (Pkt)  (Kt)
k4 [ DRtl.  - ct  (Y4 - Yt) I }  ,
where  the superscript  "o"  denotes  optimality  in  the situation  without  any  CIT.
Differentiating  (19)  with  respect  to  uutput,  setting  the  derivative  equal
to zero  and  denoting  the  optimal  output  by  Yo ,  we obtain  the following  first-
order  condition:
(20)  lYte (dPY)  dY(X  )  +  Py  _  - k,c  c  0
dY,z  dYt"yt
- 1  by (17)
In (20)  Pyt  is not  a constant,  since  we do not assume  perfect  competition
in this section. Equation  (20)  in effect  boils  down to the condition  that in
equilibrium  MR - MC +  k 4ct. We are  interested  in  examining  the sign  of the  term
k4c 1. The  reaction  coefficient  ct  is a non-negative  constant  by assumption. So
we need to determine only the sign of k4. The Lagrangoan  multiplier X4- 25 -
represents  the contribution  of DN+1 to the objective  function. Since  the net
present  value  of the  firm  will  ceteris  paribus  be reduced  by an increase  in  the
output  of rival  firms,  k4 is  negative. The  term  k4c 4 is therefore  negative  and
has  the  same  effect  on the firm's  optimal  output  which  a  reduction  in  MC would
havet  it  increases  output  above  the  level  which  would  be  optimal  in  the  absence
of limit  pricing.  We have therefore  shown  that there is scope for a limit
pricing  firm  to reduce  its  output  in response  to the imposition  of the CIT.
Next  we  derive  the  rental  prices  of capital  services  under  the assumption
that  the firm  is  able  to shift  the  CIT  forward  conipletely  in  the short  run. We
are  not  claiming  that  complete  short-run  shifting  of the  CIT is likely  to occur
in  many  industries,  perhaps  it  never  happens.  We are  simply  asking  the  question:
What  would  the  expressions  for  the  rental  prices  of capital  services  be if  the
firms  in a particular  industry  were completely  successful  in shifting  the CIT
foriard  in  the  short  run.
After  the  change  in  the  CIT  the  dominant  firm  is  assumed  to  reduce  its
output  and  increase  its  price  in such  a  way that its  after-tax  profit  is equal
to its  profit  prior  to  the  tax  change,  the  definition  of  full  shifting. In  other
words,  the  dominant  firm  is  assumed  to succeed  completely  in  passing  the  CIT  on
to the consumers  of its products.  This assumption  is captured  in shifting
equation  (21)  introduced  below.
The  objective  function  is given  by equation  (1)  above,  and  the  borrowing
constraint  by (4). The  entry  constraint  is  the same  as (18)  in  the absence  of
the CIT, except  that  we denote  the non-entry  output  in  the  situation  of  full
short-run  shifting  as  Y' . Since  the least-cost  combination  is independent  of
whether full  tax shifting  does or does not take place,  the derivation  of the
firm's  minimum  variable  cost  function G! (fe)  ("fa"  stands  for  full shifting]
is the same  as the derivation  of  G!  above,  and  G* (fa)  can be incorporated- 2CN -
into the objective function immediately.  After the cost-minimizing combination
of inputs  has been determined,  the dominant firm is  assumed to choose its optimal
quantity  of  output  in  such  a  way  as to make its after-tax profit equal to its
profit  prior to the tax change, as stated in equation (21):
(21)  (.Pyt)  (Yc)  - dv'(fs)  (-)  - (i,)(bt)  (At)  - (u,,)  (I&)  -
ap(Pppd  (Kpt)  - '5k(,Pt)  (Kkt;)  - CZTP,  =
(Pyt) (Yto) - Gt(-)  - isv)(bt)  (At)  - (upt) (ffc)  -
8P(Ppd)  (Kpt)  -
6 k(Pk)  (Kke)
where  Y*  and  Go  are the firm's optimal output and minimum variable cost
function prior to the imposition of the CIT.  Augmenting the objective function
(1)  by borrowing constraint (4),  entry constraint (18) and shifting assumption
(21),  we obtain the following Lagrangean:
co
(22)  L  =  e  E  Da,,:(Py,t)  (Yt)  - Gt(fs)  ()  - (it,  t..)  (At)  - (upt)  (le)
(P,:t)  (Ipt)  - (ikc)  (Ikt)  +  DAt,:  - CITPt
- ,  '  - (Ppt,,)  (Kpt, 1) +  (Ppt)  (Kpt)  - (Pkt,1  (Kkt,l  +  (Pkt)  (K)J
- [DRt,:  - c,  (Y+  - Yc) I
-k.5  [(Pyt)  ( (Yt)  - G't (fs)  (  -(it,  t,.)  (be) (At)  - (upt)  (Kt")
- 8V(PPd)  (Kpt)  -
8 k(Pkd)  (Kkt)  CXTPt:
(Pyt:) (Yt,:)  + G"(-)  +  (it,  t4.)  (be)  (At:)  +  (u..)  (14)
+ 8p(Pd)  (Kpc)  +  ak(Pk)  (Kk,)])
Differentiating  (22)  with respect to Y,  and setting the derivative equal
to zero, we obtain the following first-order condition:
t23)  Tst  Yt(fS  Y'  + Py  - T  t ]1-  )-kt°
dYt"  d,(.fs)  t  Y(fs)
=  1  by (17)
In the absence of the CIT kS  =  0 and Tct  =  1, and if the dominant firm does
not use limit pricing to deter entry, k4 =  0 as well.  In  that case equation (23)- 27  -
reduces to the well-known equilibrium condition MR =  MC, and the dominant firm
maximizes its short-run profits.
When the dominant firm reduces its output in  response to the change in the
CIT, this action may induce rival firms to increase  their own output R.  In that
case industry output YI  and therefore the price of output P  y would not change,
preventing the dominant firn from shifting the CIT forward.  However, in this
context it is not relevant how likely or unlikely it is for a dominant firm to
be able to succeed completely in shifting the CIT forward in the short run.  We
are merely interested in finding out what the firm's rental prices of capital
services  would be if it  did succeed in  shifting the tax completely.  For the sake
of the argument we therefore assume that entry conditions remain unchanged for
the dominant or incumbent firm.  Specifically, we assume that the difference
between the firm's non-entry output and its actual output is the same before and
after imposition of the CIT:
(24)  Y"  - Yr  = Y* - Y*t(fs)
First-order condition (23) implicitly defines optimal output  Yt (fs) as
a function of the following variables:
(25)  A(fs)  =  Y*t(fs)  [Xt,  Pyt,  Wpt'  Kot,  Ipt,  Kgt  'k'  t,  Ts,  k4,  k5]
Replacing  gross  investment  in the  two  capital  stocks  by  the  sum  of
replacement investment and net investment, and substituting equations (21) and
(24) into Lagrangean (22), we obtain:
00
(26)  L  e.  E  D.,t((Py,)  (Yt)  - Go(-)  - (it..)  (At)  - (uPt)  (Ut)
t=s
-
8 k(P't)  (Kpk)  - (Ppk.1)  (Kpt1)  - (Ppt)  (Kpt)
8* (Pkr)  (K*t)  (Pjt.,)  (Kke.l)  + (Pkt) (K*t  + DAt.l
k 2 [DAt.l  - (P:.i)  (Rp, 1) +  (  (Kpt)  - (P*t.1)  (Kkcl)  +  (Pet)  (Kkc)
- k6 [DRt.l  - c.  (YX  -At  (1fs)  ) ] }
Lagrangean  (26)  does not contain any of the parameters of the CIT.  It is
therefore not surprising that under the assumptions made in this section the- 28  -
first-order  conditions  for  the  optimal  stocks  of physical  and  knowledge  capital
turn out to be free of tax parameters.  The derivation  of these optimality
conditions  can  be found  in appendix  (4). They  are  given  by:
-l  ag'  . ag#  +  (1-  -)  g  = (27)  etx(,  a4= 1 l+e.cc
I  l  agt+l  agle  rt___
e t  'Lap  + et {i  }]  *l
(28)  eagt  +  (1  e tk)  a
14+a4 1 aA.kt  e.s  ae  t.l
+  - et(Pjt.^)  (ak  + et{Uel. l+I.  tcci
The  left-hand  sides  of these  optimality  conditions  represent  the  expected
net  marginal  benefits  from  increasing  the  two  capital  stocks,  while  their  right-
hand sides  are  the rental  prices  of the services  from  physical  and knowledge
capital  respectively  under  the assumption  that there  is full  short-run  forward
shifting  of the CIT.  In future  these expressions  for the rental prices  of
capital  services  will be referred  to as rppt(fs)  [equation  (27)]  and as rpk(fu)
(equation  (28)3,  where  "fsal  again  denotes  full  shifting.
As mentioned  before,  for  the Pakistani  textile  industry  data limitations
prevented  us from  incorporating  R&D  and  the  stock  of knowledge  capital  into  the
model. For  that  industry  the  rental  price  of  the  services  from  knowledge  capital
(equation  (28)3  is  therefore  irrelevant.
First-order  conditions  (27)  in  the  presence  of full  tax  shifting  and (15)
in its absence,  both correspond  to equations (7) and  (16) of Pindyck and
Rotemberg  (1983). The difference  is that our optimality  conditions  are fully
consistent  with rational  expectations  on the  part  of firms,  and  that our  model
incorporates  non-separable  internal  adjustment  costs  due  to gross  investment  in
physical  and  knowledge  capital.
At the  time of the imposition  of (change  in)  the  CIT the  dominant  firm's
capital  stocks  are still  the same  as they  would  be in  the absence  of the  tax.
But over  time the firm's  optimal  capital  stocks  K% (fe)  and  K4 (fs)  in the- 29 -
presence  of full  tax  shifting  evolve  differently  from  its  optimal  capital  stocks
K  and  Kk  prior  to the  change  in  the  CIT.  The reason  for  this  difference
is  that  the  firm's  equilibrium  output Yg  (fe)  in  the case  of full  tax  shifting
is less  than its  optimal  output Yt  prior  to  the  change  in  the  CIT,  and  a  lower
output  results  in lower  equilibrium  capital  stocks  as  well.
Once again, the  intent of this section  of the paper was to derive
expressions  for  the  rental  prices  of capital  services  under  the  assumption  that
a firm  with  unexerted  market  power  succeeds  completely  in  passing  the  CIT  on  to
consumers  in the  form  of a  higher  output  price. We do not  claim  that the  case
of full  shifting  is likely  to occur  often,  it  may never  happen  at all. All we
are suggesting  is that one should  let  the data  decide  whether  or not full  tax
shifting  occurred  in a particular  industry  during  the period  being studied,
rather  than  one's  prior  beliefs.
Appendix (6)  discusses  the functional  form of the equations  which were
estimated.  It also describes  the non-nested  hypothesis  tests which were
conducted  to  test  the  two  pairs  of  rental  prices  for  capital  services,  hence  the
two  assumptions  about  the  absence  or  presence  of  complete  short-run  tax  shifting,
against  each  other. The  data  are  described  in  appendix  (7),  while  the  empirical
results  are  presented  in the  next  section.
4.  Emoirical  results
In section (3.2)  above we made the assumption  that there is perfect
competition,  i.e.  that  the  firms  are  price  takers  in  their  output  markets. Under
the pair of assumptions  that there is perfect competition  and no short-run
forward  shifting  of the  CIT, our  econometric  models  consists  of equation  (A35)
for output, equations (A33) and  (A34) for the variable inputs labour and- 30  -
materials, (A43) for investment in physical capital Ip,  and (A44)  for investment
in knowledge  capital  Ik.
In  section (3.3)  above we  explored what would happen if  the firms in  a given
industry  had  unexerted  market  power  and were  able to  shift the  CIT  on  to
consumers completely.  For that  pair of joint hypotheses our system of equations
is given by (A36) for output Y, (A45)  for I.,  and (A46) for Ik. Equations (A33)
and (A34)  for labour and materials are the same as for the alternative scenario
of perfect competition and no shifting.
There is a third possibility, which we have not mentioned so far in order
to keep the exposition clearer:  the firms in a given industry may have market
power, they may try to shift the CIT forward by raising the prices of their
outputs, but they may be only partially successful in doing so; or they may not
even try to shift the CIT forward if their  market power is already fully exerted
at the time of the change in the CIT.  The pair of joint hypotheses  "market
power, partial or no tax shifting" represents the scenario iwhich  is perhaps the
most likely one  a priori.  Under these joint hypotheses equations  (A43) for
output, (A33) and (A34)  for the variable inputs labour and materials,  (A43)  for
investment  I,,  in physical  capital  and  (A44) for  investment  Ik in knowledge
capital form the system of equations.
Due to data limitations the model for the Pakistani textile industry is a
system of four rather than five equations, omitting the equation for investment
in  knowledge capital Ik. The  three possible versions of the model are summarized
in the chart below.- 31  -
SumMary  chart  for the  different  versions  of the  model
The  firms  have  market  power  The  firms  are price  takers
which  is only  partially  exerted  in their  output  markets
at the  time  of the  change  in
the  CIT
Optimal  output  is determined  |Optimal  output  is  determined
by the  equilibrium  condition  by the  equilibrium  condition
MR  MC  p =  MC
I  The  firms  succeed  The  firms  succeed  only  The  firms  are
completely  in shifting  partially,  or do  not  not  able  to  shift
the  CIT  forward  in the  succeed  at all,  in  the  CIT  forward
short  run  shiftg.the  CIT  forward  in the  short  run
in the  short  run
I~  I
The  investment  equations  The  investment  equations
contain  the  expressions  for  contain  the  expressions  for
the  user  costs  of  capital  the  rental  prices  of capital
w,ithout the  parameters  of  services  with  tax  parameter
the  CIT
Tax  incentives  have  no  Tax  incentives  do have  a
substitution  effect  on  substitution  effect  on
production  and  investment  production  and  investment
decisions  decisions- 32 -
4.1  Pakistani  textile  industry
We tested  the joint  hypotheses  "unexerted  market  power,  partial  or no tax
shifting"  and "perfect  competition,  no tax shifting"  against  each other by
implementing  a pair of non-nested  hypothesis  tests.  Table (1) reports the
results  from  these  tests.
Table  M11
Pakistani  textile  industry
Results  from  the  non-nested  hvnothesis  tosts
Specif.  Ho: perfect  competition,  HO:  unexerted  market  power,
partial  or no tax  shifting  no  tax shifting
10  t  . t
WI =  WL  0.974  18.53 Ho  reiected  0.0219  0.566  Ho not  rej.
1  =  WM  0.965  2.68  Ho  reiected  0.000181 0.896  Ho  not  rej.
These  results  suggest  quite  strongly  that  the  joint  hypotheses  of  perfect
competition  and  no tax  shifting  have  to  be rejected  in  favour  of the  hypotheses
of market power and partial or no tax shifting.  Making the conventional
assumption  of  perfect  competition  for  the  textile  industry  of  Pakistan  would  thus
have  involved  a  mis-specification  of  the  econometric  model,  since  the  hypothesis
of  perfect  competition  was  rejected  quite  decisively  for  this  industry.  However,
even  though  our  results  indicate  that  the  firms  of  the  Pakistani  textile  industry
had  market  power  during  the  sample  period  instead  of  being  perfectly  competitive,
the firms  did  not succeed  completely  in shifting  the  CIT forward  in the short
run.  Therefore  the  parameters  of the  CIT  entered  the  expression  for  the  rental
price  of  the  services  from  physical  capital,  so  that  tax  incentives  had  an  effect
on  the  user  cost  of capital  of firms  in  this industry  during  the  sample  period.
To give an idea  of the quality  c-  the estimation  results,  we report  in
table  (2)  below  the  elasticities  of  the  demand  for  labour  and  for  materials  with
respect  to changes  in the input  prices  for  the  mid-point  of the sample.  The
results  of table (2)  show that both own-price  elasticities  have the correct- 33 -
negative sign.  The formulae from  which theae elasticities were computed can be
found in appendix (5).
Table (28
Pakistani t-xtile industry
Elasticities of the demand for labour and for materials with respoct to the
input irices, for 1974. unexerted market vower and Partial or no tax shiftina
(estimated standard errors in brackets below the elasticities)
eLWL  =  - 0.194  eS14  '  0.541
(0.178)  (1.300)
eL'M5M  =  0.182  e  - - 0.558
(0.186)  (1.343)
eLRPK  0.0119  e1hWK  0.0165
(0.0199)  (0.0717)
The non-nested  hypothesis tests reported in  table (1)  above showed that  the
parameters of the CIT influenced the rental price of the services from physical
capital for  the Pakistani textile industry.  It is  therefore useful to determine
what effect tax incentives had during the sample period on the decisions of this
industry.  Table (3)  below reports the effect  of a small  change in  the investment
tax credit on the endogenous variables of the model during 1980, the mid-point
of the time period within our sample during which the investment tax credit was
in effect  (1977 to 1983).  The  formulae from which  these elasticities  were
calculated are given in appendix (5).
=ale  (3)
Pakistani toxtile industrv
Elasticities of the endogenous variables of the model with respect to
small changes in the investment  tax  credit,  for 1980
eimp  =  0.00251  eG  =  - 0.00091
eLMp  - 0.00136  eM  =p  - - 0.01303
There are two channels through which changes in the rental price of the
services from physical capital are transmitted to the demand for labour and for
materials:  A  reduction  in the rental price  of  capital  services due  to an
increase in the tax credit increases  investment expenditures, which  in turn- 34 -
affect  the demand for  the variable inputs:  If  capital and labour (materials) are
substitutes, the increase in investment expenditures reduces the demand for the
variable inputs.  If  capital and labour (materials)  are complements, the increase
in investment expenditures increases the eemand for the variable  inputs.  In
addition, the increase in investment expenditures temporarily reduces output,
hence the demand for the variable inputs labour and materials.  The reason for
this temporary reduction in  output is  that there are adjustment costs associated
with investment expenditures, which manifest themselves as a short-run loss of
output [see  Treadway (1970)  and (1974)  on the desirability of this specification
of adjustment costs as internal and non-separable].
Table 3 tbJ
Impact of a 10% Increase  in Investment Tax Credit on Textile Industry Investment
and  Government  Revenues  - in  1980.
Increase in Investment =  Rupees 276,053
Reduction in Corporate Tax Revenues =  Rupees 16,497,204
Incremental  Benefit-Cost  Ratio= Increase  in  Investment/Reduction  in  Corporate  Tax
Revenues  =  0.017
Source :  Model-based calculations
The  results presented  in Table  3  (b) suggest that  an increase  in the
investment tax credit had  trie  predicted  but quite small effects  on the endogenous
variables of our model:  Ii.  increased investment, and reduced output and the
demand for labour and for  materials.  If the investment tax credit had been 10%
larger ir.  1980, investment in the textile industry  would have been approximately
276,000 Rupees higher during that year at a revenue loss of 16 million rupees.
Thus the  incremental benefit-cost ratio  for investment tax  credit was quite
small.- 35 -
4.2  Pakistani chemical anq oharMaceutical industrios
We first performed a  pair of non-nested hypothesis testa to test the joint
hypotheses "perfect competition, no tax shifting" and "market power, full tax
shifting" against each other.  The results are reported in table (4) below.
Table (4)
Pakistani chemical and pharmaceutical industries
Results from the first set of non-nested hYbothesis tests
Specif.  Hot  market power,  HO:  perfect competition,
full shifting of the CIT  no shifting of  the CIT
A  A
S  t  Q  t
WI  =  WL  1.004  20.01  Ho  rejected  0.198  0.583  Ho  not rej.
WI = WM  0.555  1.56  Ho  not rej.  0.074  0.079  H0 not rej.
As table (4)  shows, the pair of joint hypotheses "perfect competition, no
tax shifting" could not be rejected by the data and the competing pair of joint
hypotheses for either specification of the model.  On the other hand, the joint
hypotheses "market power, full shifting" were rejected quite decisively for  the
specification with labour as the num6raire input.
It ren.ained  to be seen, however, whether the pair of hypothases "perfect
competition,  no  tax  shifting"  would  do  equally  well  against  the  pair  of
hypotheses "market power, partial or no tax shifting".  To this end we tested
these two pairs of joint hypotheses against each other in a second set of non-
nested hypothesis tests, for which table (5) reports the results.
Table  515
Pakistani chemical and pharmaceutical industries
Results from the second set of non-nested hvyothesis tests
Specif.  Ho:  market power,  Ho:  perfect competition,
partial/no tax shifting  no shifting of  the CIT
A  A
S  t  Q  t
WI =  WL  0.218  1.60  Ho  not rej.  0.510  1.63  Ho  not  rej.
WI =  WM  0.424  1.14  Ho  not rej.  1.065  11.78  Ho  rejected- 36 -
The  joint  hypotheses  "market  powez,  partial  or  no tax  shifting"  could  not
be rejected  by the competing  pair  of joint  hypotheses  for  either  specification
of the  model.  On the other hand,  "perfect  competition,  no tax shifting"  was
rejected  quite  decisively  by the alternative  pair  of joint  hypotheses  for  the
specification  with materials  as  the num6raire  input.
Since  our non-nested  hypothesis  tests show that full short-run  forward
shifting  of the  CIT  has  to be rejected  for  the industries  we examined,  we know
that  the  CIT  influenced  the  rental  prices  of capital  services  during  the  sample
period. It is therefore  useful  to determine  what effect  tax incentives  had  on
the decisions  of the industries  we studied. But first  we report  in table (6)
below  the elasticities  of the  demand  for  labour  and  for  materials  with respect
to  small  changes  in  the  wage  rate,  the  price  of  materials,  and  the  rental  prices
of  investment  in  physical  and  knowledge  capital.  Then,  in  table  (7),  we show  the
effect  of the investment  tax credit  for  physical  investment  on the endogenous
variables  of the  model. Finally,  in  table  (8),  we report  the  effect  of a small
reduction  in the fraction  of R&D  which  the  firms  are  allowed  to expense.
The formulae  from  which  all  these  elasticities  were computed  can  be found
in appendix  (5).
able  (6)
Pakistani  chemical  and  2harxaceutical  industries
Elasticitios  of the  demand  for  labour  and  for  materials
with respoet  tnQ  hanges  in the  inout  prices.  midpoint  of the sample
(approximate  standard  errors  in  brackets)
eLV& a  0.761  eMWL  0.174
(0.310)  (0.190)
eLW4  =  0.781  eMM  =  - 0.188
(0.315)  (0.194)
eLRpK  0.00092  MaPK  - 0.0135
(0.00551)  (0.0093)
eLRpp  N  - 0.0202  Suup  0.00008
(0.0140)  (0.00016)
The  results  of  table  (6)  show  that  the  own-price  elasticities  bth  have  the
correct  negative  sign.  Furthermore,  the  elasticities  of  the  demand  for  labour- 37 -
with respect to small changes in  the wage rate and  in  the price of materials are
both statistically significant.
TaIb  37(
Pakistani chemical and ghary ceutical LIZAustries
Elasticities of R&D exgenditures. phvsigal investment. outgut.labour
and materials with resPect to small chance_ in the investment tax credit.
midpoint  of  the  samAlO
eD2p  - - 0.108
IpeMP  0.386
eymp  =  - 0.026
eLMp  - - 0.0796
- O.0(015
Table (7)  above  reports  the effect on  the endogenous variables of  the model
of a small change in  the tax credit for  pi,ysical  investment.  An increase in  the
tax credit for  physical investment  reduces the rintal price of the services from
physical capital, which in turn results in  more investment in physical capital,
which is no doubt the effect intended by policy makers.  The increase in
investment causes  adjustment costs in the  form of a temporary  reduction  in
output, which  in turn  lowers the demand for the variable  inputs labour and
materials.
Table 7(b)
Impact of a 10% Increase in Investment  _ax  Credit on
Pakistani Chemical and Pharmaceutical Industries - in 1980.
Increase in Investment =  Rupees (million) 20.530
Reduction in Corporate Tax Revenues  - Rupees (million) 7.986
Increase in  Inventment /  Reduction in Government Revenues - 2.6
Source :  Model-based calculations
Table 7(b)  reports on the impact  of a small  change in investment  tax credit
on government  revenues and  investment. It shows that  for a 10%  increase in
investment tax credit, investment in physical capital would have increased by- 38 -
about 21 million rupees at a loses  in government revenues of 8 million rupees
yielding an incremental benefit-cost ratio of 2.6. Thus increases in investment
tax  credit  would  be  a  cost-effective  policy  instrument  to  promote  private
investment in Pakistani chemical and pharmaceutical industries.
Table (8)  below reports the effect on the endogenous variables of a small
reduction in  the fraction  of R&D  which firms  are allowed  to treat as expenditures
in the year in which they are incurred.
Table 18
Pakistani chemical and pharmaceutical industries
Elasticities of R&D exnenditures, Phvsical investment, output. labour
and materials with respect to a small reduction in the fraction of R&D
which firms are allowed to exgense. midocint of the sample
ejiKQK  =  0.657
eilQK  =  - 0.597
eYQK  =  - 0.047
eLQK =  - 0.00849
eMQK =  - 0.0941
The effect  of  a small reduction below  its present value  of  1  in the
proportion of R&D which the firms are allowed to expense, would be to increase
rpk(tax) and  to reduce investment  in  knowledge capital, i.e.  expenditures on  R&D.
This  is  confirmed  by  the  positive  sign  of  eWQK  which  implies  that  R&D
expenditures and the fraction qk  move in  the same direction.  If there were less
R&D, output and  therefore the demand for  the variable inputs  labour and  materials
would increase.  It ic interesting to note that for the industries of  our sample
an increase in R&D expenditures is not  accompanied by an increase in physical
investment.  The reason may well be that in these industries R&D expenditures
consist mainly  of  labour costs  incurred in order to  adapt  innovations made
elsewhere to the existing capital equipment.- 39 -
Table 8 (b)
Impact of a 10% !eduction in R&D Tax Allowance on R&D Investments
in Pakistani Chemical and Pharmaceutical Industries and Government Revenues
Reduction in R&D Expenditures =  Rupees (million) 1.8
Increase in Government Revenues - Rupees (million) 1.0
Ratio of R&D Loss to Revenue Gains =  1.75
Source: Model-based calculations
Table 8(b) quantifies the impact of a 10% reduction in RFD tax allowance
on R&D investment in Pakistani chemical and pharmaceutical indus.ries. It shows
that if the tax allowance for  R&D had been 10% less,  R&D expenditures would have
been approximately 1.8  million Rupees lower and government revenues higher by a
million rupees. Thus R&D tax allowance has fulfilled its policy objectives.
4.3  Turkish chemical and petroleum derivatives industries
Before presenting  the  results of  our hypothesis  tests, we  report  the
elasticities of the demand for labour and for materials with respect to small
changes in the wage  rate, the price of materials,  and the  rental prices of
investment in physical and knowledge capital in table (9).
Table (9)
Turkish chemical and Petroleum derivatives industries
Elasticities of the demand for labour and for materials
with resoect to chanaes in the input prices. midpoint of the samole
(approximate standard errors in brackets)
GLWL  =  - 0.2975  eMW  0.3593
(0.7297)  (0.2979)
eLM  =  0.2970  M  =  - 97
(0.7286)  (0.2981)
eLRPK=  0.00028  empK  =  0.00007
(0.00039)  (0.00009)
eLRpp  =  0.00019  eMRpp  0.00034
(0.00116)  (0.00020)- 40 -
The formulae from which these elasticities and those in all subsequent
tables were computed can be found in  appendix (5).  In  the above table WL stands
for the  price of labour,  WM for the price of  materials, RPK for  the rental price
of the services from knowledge capital, and RPP for the user cost of physical
capital.  These  results  show that the  own-price elasticities  both  have the
correct negative sign.
We first tested the pair of joint hypotheses "market power, full shifting
of the CIT" and "perfect comptetition, no tax shifting" against each other.  The
results from these non-nested hypothesis tests were inconclusive, since neither
pair of joint hypotheses was able to reject the alternative pair of hypotheses.
Next we  tested the joint hypotheses  "market power,  full tax  shifting"
against the pair of hypotheses "market  power, partial or no tax shifting".  The
results from this pair of non-nested hypothesis tests are reported in the next
table.
Table (10)
Turkish chemical and Petroleum derivatives industries
Results from the non-nested hvyothesis tests
Specif.  HO:  market power,  Hot  market power,
full shifting of the CIT  partial or no shifting
S  t  S  t
WI  =  WL  1.007  3.702  Ho rejected  0.212  0.735  H0 not rej.
Wi  t  WM  0.492  0.987  Ho  not rej.  0.969  0.832  Ho  not rej.
The joint hypotheses "market power, partial or no tax shifting" could not
be rejected by the competing pair of joint hypotheses for either specification
of the model.  On the other hand, the pair of hypotheses "market  power, full tax
shifting" was  rejected by the alternative  pair of  joint hypotheses  for the
specification with labour as the numeraire input.  This result agrees with what
intuition  predicts:  While  it  is quite  conceivable  that  the  firms  in the
industries we studied had market power instead of being price takers, it is not- 41 -
very  likely that  they  succeeded  completely  in passing  the CIT  on  to  their
customers in the form of higher output prices.
Since our tests showed that full  short-run forward shifting of the CIT has
to be rejected for the industries of our sample, we know that the CIT influenced
the rental prices of capital serviceo  during the sample period.  Therefore it is
useful  to  detarmine  what  effect  tax  incentives  had  on  the  production  and
investment  decisions  of  the  Turkish  chemical  and  petroleum  derivatives
industries.  In table (11), we report the effect of a small change in the tax
allowance for investment in physical capital on the endogenous variables of the
model.  Table (12) reports the effect of a small change in the tax allowance for
investment in knowledge capital, i.e. for R&D expenditures, on the endogenous
variables of the model.
Trable  J11)
Turkish  chemical  and  uyetroleum  aerivatives  industries
Slasticities of R&D exoenditures, Phvsical investment, output.labour
and materials with resoect to small chanass in the investment allowance for
ghrsical capital. midpoint of the samol_
efKQp =  0.00021
eQp  =  0.00270
eyQp  =  - 0.00148
eLQp  - - 0.00019
OMQP  0  0.00052
An increase in the investment allowance for physical capital reduces the
rental price of the services from physical capital, which in turn results in a
small  increase  in  investment  in  physical  capital.  Increased  investment  in
physical capital is accompanied by more R&D expenditures.  The increase in  both
types  of investment causes adjustment co3ts in terms of temporarily reduced
output, which  in turn  lowers the demand  for the variable  inputs labour and
materials.- 42  -
Table  11(bi
Impact  of a  10%  Increase  iAn  Investment  Allowance  on  Investment
in Turkish  Chemical  and  Petroleum  Derivatives  Industries.
Increase in Investmert =  Turkish Lira 157,858
Lost tax Revenues =  Turkish Lira 7,542,127
Ratio ce Investment Gain to Revenue Loss =  0.02
Source: Model-based calculations
Table 11 (b) reports on the impact of a small increase in the investment
allowance for  physical capital on investment  and government revenues. This table
indicates  that the  investment allowances  offered  to Turkish industries had  little
impact  on their investments but  resulted in  a  major drain  on government revenues.
Table (12)  reports the effect  on the  endogenous variables of  a small change
in the tax allowance for investment in knowledge capital.
Table (12)
Turkish chemical and petroleum derivatives industries
Elasticities of R&D expenditures. phvsical investment, output. labour
and materials with respect to a small change in the fraction of R&D
which firms are allowed to expense, midpoint of the sample
elKQK  0.00336
enlQK =  0.01031
eyQK  =  - 0.00279
eLQK  =  - 0.00038
eMQK  =  - 0.00069
The positive sign of erKQK  implies that a small  change in the tax allowance
for 3nowledge capital caused expenditures on R&D to move in the same direction.
Investment  in  physical  capital  also  moved  in  the  same  direction  as  R&D
expenditures.  This  is what  one would expect, since new technology  is often
embodied  in new physical  capital.  Output and therefore  the demand  for the
variable inputs  labour and  materials moved in the  opposite direction in  the short
run only from changes in expenditures on R&D.  This is what theory predicts,- 43 -
since investment is accompanied by short-run adjustment costs in terms of lost
output.
Table 12 (b)
lmgact ofa  10% Reduction in R&D Allow nce on  R&D Investment By
Turkish Chemical and Petroleum Derivatives Industries and Government Revenues
Reduction in R&D Investment =  Turkish Lira  149,470
Gain in Tax Revenues =  Turkish Lira 19,128,593
Ratio of R&D Investment Reduction to Gain in Tax Revenues =  0.008
Source: Model-based calculations
Table 12(b) suggests  that R&D tax allowances for Turkish industries  proved
to be a poor instrument for stimulating R&D investment. Revenue losses to the
treasury from this instrument far exceeded the investment gains.
5.  Summary anG policy implications
In  this paper an intertemporal model of a firm optimizing its expected net
present value was used to derive expressions for the rental prices of capital
services which are consistent  with rational expectations on the part of economic
agents.  Then it  was demonstrated that if firms were successful in shifting the
burden of the CIT completely on to consumers in the short run, the expressions
for the rental prices of capital services would be free of the parameters of the
CIT.  The functional form of the variable cost function was specified, and the
method of  estimating the  model was discussed.  Non-nested hypothesis tests showed
that for our samples the hypothesis of market power was able to reject that of
perfect competition.  However, even  though the firms  in the industries  we studied
had market power during the sample period, they were not able to shift the CIT
forward  completely  in  the  short  run.  This  result  agrees  with  our  prior
expectation that while firms  with  unexerted market power are  quite likely  to  make
an attempt at passing the CIT on to their customers in  the form  of higher output
prices, it is very urlikely that such attempts would be completely successful.
Only in  the case of complete short-run forward shifting of  the CIT are  the rental- 44 -
prices  of capital  services  free  of  the  parameters  of  the  CIT. If  the  firms  have
to bear even  part of the  burden  of the CIT in the short  run, their  after-tax
profits  differ  from  their  profits  prior  to  the  tax  change,  and  the  parameters  of
the CIT do enter the expressions  for the rental  prices  of capital  services.
Since for the firms in our samples  tax incentives  did have an effect  on the
production  and  investment  decisions  of  the firms,  we computed  estimates  of the
effect  of several  tax  incentives  on the  endogenous  variables  of the  model.
If  we  had  made  the  conventional  assumption  of  perfect  competition,  we  would
have used equation  (A35)  for output,  instead  of equation  (A36). As our non-
nested  hypothesis  tests showed,  for  the industries  we studied  that would  have
been a  mis-specification  of the  output  equation,  and  any  estimation  results  for
such a mis-specified  model would have been incorrect.  Therefore  we did not
calculate  any elasticities  for  the  version  of the model  which assumes  perfect
competition,  hence  no shifting  of the  CIT.
With  our  non-nested  hypothesis  tests  we  were  able  to  determine  whether  full
short-run  forward  shifting  of  the  CIT  is  absent  or  present. If  full  tax  shifting
is  absent,  our  teots  are  not  able  to  distinguish  between  different  degrees  of  tax
shifting. (The  reason  is  that  tax  parameters  affect  the  rental  prices  of  capital
services  in situations  of partial  tax shifting  as well as in the case of no
shifting,  and we test the user costs of capital with and without the tax
parameters  against  each other.) This limitation  of our model  does not  matter
from  the  point  of view  of  tax  policy,  however: Our  non-nested  hypothesis  tests
are  able  to  answer  the  question  whether  tax  incentives  do  or  do  not  influence  the
rental  prices  of capital  services.  It is well known that the user cost of
capital is one of the main channels  through which tax  incentives  affect
investment.  Therefore  it  JB important  to  test  for  the  presence  or  absence  of  tax
parameters  in  the  rental  prices  of  capital  services,  instead  of  assuming  a  priori
that  they  are  present.
Since  the  pre-condition  for  full  tax  shifting,  i.e.  unexerted  market  power,
may well be met for some industries,  but not for others, it is important  to
conduct  these  hypothesis  tests for  individual  industries,  rather  than for  the- 45  -
whole  manufacturing  sector.  Collecting  the  required  data  and  doing  the  necessary
computations  is a time  consuming  task,  but  one that is well  worth  the effort,
given  the important  policy  implications  of the  results.
Table  13 presents  a summary  of  the results  obtained  in  this paper  on the
effectiveness  of tax  incentives.  The results are quite mixed and vary by
industry.  For  example,  in  Pakistan  investment  tax  credit  had  a  highly  stimulative
impact  on investment  in  chemical  and  pharmaceutical  industries  but  little  impact
on  the  textile  industry.  R&D  expensing  also  proved  to  be  a  cost-effective  measure
for the same industries.  Turkish  tax incentives  measures (both  an investment
allowance  and R&D expensing),  on the other hand, resulted  in higher  revenue
losses  as compared  to their  investment  impacts.
Table  13
A SUMMARY VIEW ON THE  EFFECTIVENESS  QF INVESTMENT INCENTIVE8
Tax Instrument  Incremental  benefit-cost  ratio
Investment  Tax Credit
Pakistani  Textile  Industry  0.017
Pakistani  Chemical  & Pharmaceutical  Industries  2.6
Investment  Allowance
Turkish  Chemicals  & Petroleum  Derivatives  Industries  0.02
R&D  Expensing
Pakistani  Chemical  & Pharmaceutical  Industries  1.75
Turkish  Chemical  and  Petroleum  Derivatives  Industries  0.008
Source:  Model-basec.  results- 46 -
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Appngdix  (1):  Derivation  of  Borrowina  Constraint  (4)
Equation  (3)  Is  repeated  here  for  convenience  as  equation  (Al):
2
(Al)  (Pyt)  (Ye)  - E  (W..)  (v.,)  - (it'  ra)  (Ae)  - (ult)  (Kt)  - (PC)  (Ipt)  -
j=1
2
(P*t)  (Ike)  + DAt4.  - CITPt  Y  (Pyt)  (Ye)  E  E  (W,)  (Vj,)  -
j=1
(1e,a)  (A,.)  (1u,t) (4wp)  - 'P(P,t)  (pe)  - 8 t(pkt)  (Kke)  - CITP
Simplifying  (Al):
- (P,p)  (Ipe)  - (aP.)  (1kt)  +  DA4. s  - 8p(Ppe) (  t)  - 8 k(Pkt)  (4 K)
Gross  investment  in  physical  capital  (Ppt)(Ipt)  is  the  sum  of replacement
investment  %(pt)(K) and  of  net  investment  (Pt,t)(K;t+i)  - (Ppt)Ot).  Similarly,
R&D  expenditures  (Pkt)(Ikt)  are  the  sum  of replacement  investment  in  knowledge
capital  6k(Pkt)(Kkt)  and  of net investment  in knowledge  capital  (Pk, 1)(Kk 1)  -
(Pkt)(Kkt)  Therefore  (A2)  can  be  simplified  further:
(A3)  - (Ppe.i)  (Kept43)  +  (P.p)  (;je)  - (Pke1)  (Xke.1)  '  (Pxt) (e)  D  Atl  5  0
Since  optimality  requires  this  inequality  to be strictly  binding  (see
Boadway  and  Bruce  (1979)],  It  can  be  re-written  as  the  follwing  equation:
(A4)  DAt+1 =  (Ppe,.)  (K  pj)  - (,Pp)  (RK)  '  (Ske.X)  (R-e.L)  - (Pkt)  (Kkt)
(A4)  is  the  same  as  equation  (4)  in  the  text.- 49  -
APDendix  (2): Derivation  of investment  eauation  (6)
(AS)  defines  K*,  the  value  of  the  physical  stock  for  tax  purposes,  at  the
beginning  of  period  1:
(AS)  (PpF)  (CpR)  [  11-poj  (PPO)  (K;)  +  (PpO)  (Ip9)
Similarly,  the  value  of  K*  at  the  beginning  of  periods  2,  3  and  4 is
defined  by  equations  (A6)  to  (A8):
(A6)  pp,aC; = ('-a,s)  (1-41PO)PPO4 4 + (1-P2)PP.TPO  + POppIj
(A7)  P,,1,  (1-Gp)  (1-aj)  (1-aVO)Pp&t;p + (1-ap.)  (1-pj)PpVZpo
°  (1-a,,)  )P, 11  +  PX
(AS)  sPV#A  =  (1-.p)  (I-u,)  (1-au,)  (1-a,o)  P,JC;.  +  (I-apj)  (I-u,s,)  (1-aW)  PE  A
+  1_p  *XGpd  l-)PwIZp,  +  (1  pJ)Vd  PV2ZP  +  P,.ZP3
(A9)  PJRl  - Pp 3IC
I  ((-aP3)  -1]  1-cs,)  U -apl)  U -as)  PPO*o
- {^")  U -4pa)  (1  -4u)  Ppaxpo  - (apj)  U -MP,)  Ppixpl  - (aps)  PWOr
+  Ppj,,P  * (-.py)  (PP,Vp;)  + Pp* ,
By  analogy:
(AlO  )  (Pp.  (A.)  - (Ppe)  (K;C) = (-aup)  [I(Pp)  (jR;d)I  +  (Pp.)  (Ip.)
Solving  (AlO)  for  (Ppt)(Ipt):
(All)  (PpL) 'Xpt)  - (Ppos.) (18 1)  - (Pp.)  (P  f)  * (a,,)  (Ppe)  (K;)
(All)  is  equal  to  (5)  in  the  text. It  is  analogous  to  the  following
equation  in  terms  of  the  stock  of  physical  capital  and  its  economic  rate  of
depreciation:
(A12)  (Pp.) (Ip,)  - (Pp..l)  (1Cpe,1)  (Ppe)  (R,,)  +  (8,)  (Pp.)  (ir)
(A12)  states  the  well-known  fact  that  gross  investment  in  physical  capital
is  equal  to  net  investment  plus  replacement  investment.- 50  -
ApDendix (31:  Derivation  of  equations  (15)  and  (16)
For  convenience  equation  (14)  of  section  (3.2)  is  repeated  here  as (A13):
(A13)  L 3  E(  £  D8 .{tT[  (Pyt)  (Yt))  -GC')  - (be)  (it,e.a)  (Ae)  - (u,c)  (K;e)
tcg
- (1  - bt)  (Iet,.a)  (At)  + DAt.3  +  (Uct)  (akt)  (Pkr)  (K*t)
+F (UCd)  OEt')  (Ppt)  (Kpec)
- 1l  - (uct)  (qtC)t  (( 8 k)  (PJtC  (Kkt)  +  (P*kcl)  (K,e,)  - (P*k)  (Kkt)]
- (u,t)  (qpt)  - (m..)]  [(8p)  (Ppt)  (Kp)  +  (Ppc.)  (Kp,. 1 ) - (Pp,)  (p,)]
k 2 CDA.+ 1 - (Pot,1)  (Kpc+,)  + (Ppt)  (Kpt)  - (2kt+C)  (Kkt+)  +  (Pkt)  (Kkt)  J
- k'18p(Ppt)  (Kpt)  +  (ipel)  (Fl)  - (Ppt)  (Kot)  - (cge)  (Ppt)  (K;t)
- (Ppk+.)  (Kjpecl)  +  (Ppt)  (KPC) 1
k4 I 8k(Pkt)  (Kkt)  +  (AXttld  (kt-1)  ('Pke) (4t)  (Skt)  (Pkt)  (Kdr
(Pkt-l)  (K;tel)  +  (Pkt)  (Kk't)  1  }
Differentiating  (A13)  with  respect  to  At+,,  setting  the  derivative  equal
to  zero,  noting  that  at  time  t  the  variables  of  the  same  period  are  known  with
certainty,  that  °t,t  =  1  and  that t  l/(1+it,ttt):
(A.14)  0  El[ - k21  + ett/li,.)  -n.)(bt.3)  Ucr.j.t.1.4)
- (I  -. bc,)  ('Cii  e.i.a)  - 1  + k 2 I)
After  combining  terms  and  simplifying,  (A14)  ein  be  re-written  as:
(AIS)  (k2) Uce.6.1) = - iet.M + GeUvt.l,v*j+all  - ar,g.,JG'1u"+.k)J
Implicit  in  (AI5)  and  in  subsequent  equations  is  the  assumption  that  the
expected  value  of  a  product  is  equal  to  the  product  of  the  expected  values.
Differentiating  (A13)  with  respect  to lt.l  and  setting  the  derivative
equal  to  zero:
(A16)  0  a  (k)e et, 1e.1 +  artII/(lI  .J  I  )I  t(a  .±)  (  )  (pc)
+  (k)  (aDC.l)  (P,a  1)  - (k)  (Ppt.1
1 1}- 51  -
Multiplying  (A16)  by  (1+it,t+i)/et(Ppt+i1  and  solving  for  k 1:
(A.17)  e  ic  en  Iu  ear  i
Differentiating  (A13)  with  respect  to  Kw, setting  the  derivative  equal
to  zero  and  noting  that  some  terms  vanish  because  of (12):
(A18)0-  T0  ;3.=- ao.J  *  e(P,9t.)[I(mot)  +  (u),)  i-k1 +- 21 
- 1
+  e{DC, 1.l(1) (2.  - 8,  (Pp, 8 ) - Tr.- 3T  aeai  I
84m.  a4xr.  D4~.I
- (  - 8,)  (CPt.,) I(^ts)  +  (Uet.1 )  (qpt* 1)  - J-  (k)  (P,t*)J)
Re-arranging  terms  in  (A18):
(A19)  et-  2'  _  e {ec. ) (  1  -,)
+  efPmi)  -; (Ckj)  - (k,)  (.  (k)  +  (k)  (SP)
'64  C1)  _  (.k2)  - (k.2)  U  0, C.,)  +  (2)  I
- et,;L  a  - 8,) (1  - et  (u  )  em(q 0 ))
*  £efp'P)t  - (w,e)  - (uC)  (s,)]
substItutngn  (A1) and  (Al?T)  4rnt^  (Al), and  denntInn  the  left-hand  side
of  the  equation  by  "LHS":- 52  -
(WAO)  a15  - (a  +  e.
t.~~B!±
1 (e-l  i)  *e(
- ekp,. 1 I(  (ut)  (q,e)  - (  +)e(U.,)e(q,. 1) I
eC{at  (jPj  [(<>e)  _  1  C  t{D.  }  c  I (e.t-1)Ge(Pj)9-di+e.  g4
- 6(Pl)i1  (1£. £41  ,  eI(C,  1 ))
Combining  terms in  (A20):
(A21)  LRS  lap  +eL.4[18*  (I  -f(  - e  beItu  t-j))
I  +To-.£1.  £i1+
C,  £41~  ~~~~It  C3
Gl{A  . 1} (ut (q)  - De  (  I-&.)  .1u.")  I.]
- £e'DWA,1(I  e)  £41 
8 )  ~e6g1  '-tee 0 (U 0 X*. 1 b
Replacing the  nominal variables  of  (A21) by their  real  counterparts:
Gtlj  _  O  +  nad )(  1  +  T[,tt  )gt+l
Gt  -(1  + nt)9t
ppt+i  =  (1  +  1O,t)0t  +  ,t+,)Ppt+l
(I+it,t+i)  - (  +  rt,)(  +  ,tt)- 53  -
(A22)  - (1'+O,)  (Sw+,:,.)e,{,JCt+ 1) e  ag}  (1 +'  ) T  gt
+  (1w+ 0o*) (1gte  ,. 1)6,:%Tee. 1 e  g,} 1 - 8p)
(l+rz,t.*  (1+We.e.i)  'x  1(qt1
(1  - 8i,)  (1+18L,)  (1.s, :,,)ie,{u 0 t.ide,(Q-,:,
C  *e{Pp,:..1I  [((1bo.)  (ltge  e.i)  (,)  - (1-8,)  (1+.:'9,)  (1+4C  t+,d)ee(mp,:, 1
_  L+No.e 'd  ,.)alO-}i.  +  62)GVhg'P'-X}JeJUct-1)
(1*t,+  ,-)  (e+,:p,.e)  (I,t.:  +  iesgt, 1 0  )
Dividing  both  sides  of (A22)  by (1+nO,t)et{Tct+i1:
(A23)  - 1  .T,,ee  age  +  (1-18)  *{  9'C  1
1 +r,:,:,l  a4t,l  e  TXT;,;.I)  a  1+.r,, .a 
tip,  ___I  +(  - e  e(p,iJ  (  I
(3+ftC*  eGA)  "l}U)  (%V)  +  (1_-D)  e.,  {P  ,  1C}  *J  s
e¢urctle(1+r¢t.l)1(.r.,  0  e2ap¢T!
Equation  (A23) ts  equal  to  equation  (15)  in  the  text.  Equation  (16)  of  the
text  is  analogous  to (15),  except  that  the  subscript p"  for  physical  capital  has
to be replaced  by the  subscript  "k'  for knowledge  capital,  and mkt as well as
et{mkt+1l  are  equal to zero,  since in both countries  there is a tax allowance
rather  than  a  tax  credit  for  R&D  expenditures. The  interested  reader  can verify
this by differentiating  (A13) with respect to At+1, Kkt+1 and  l  and
eliminating  the Lagrangean  multipliers  k, and k2 by substitution,  as was done
above.- 54  -
ADpendix (t4: Derivation  of  Eauatlons  (27)  and (28)
For  convenience  the  Lagrangean  of  equation  (26)  of  the  text  is  repeated
here  as  (A24):
eD
(A24)  L  es,  E  D,.((PVt) (Y1°)  - Geo(j.) - ('e.e.)  (At)  - (ipt)  (Kpe)
tug
- t*p(Pp)  (RXe)  - (Pvt.,)  (Kpe.l)  +  (Pvt)  (K,t)
8k(PIkc) (Kke)  (Pke.1) (Xkg.,)  +  (Pie)  (Kke)  + DAe.,
- k^ CDAe.i  - (Ppt  l)  (l  +  (I,Pp)  (Jr,t)  - (Pke-S)  (Kke91)  +  (Pke) (i4)  1
- I  DRC.i  - C(  Ye* - Yt  (fs)  ) 1  }
Differentiating  (A24)  with  respect  to  At+,,  setting  the  derivative  equal
to  zero,  noting  that  current  period  variables  are  known  with  certainty,  and  that
Dt,t+i  = 1/( 1 +it,t+l we  obtain:
(A25)  0  -1  4  1  ;;  c  -1  - +  e*ie.9g.i.1)j
Multiplying  both  sides  of (A25)  by  (I1 +ttt+1)  and  simplifying:
(A26) (it,t.)  (1  - k2)  Ge(e.i.c.i.a)
Differentiating  (A24)  with  respect  to  Kpt+,,  setting  the  derivative  equal
to  zero,  and  noting  that  several  terms  vanish  because  of  first-order  condition
(23)  in  the  text:- 55  -
(A27)  0 - - z;  - EeS(P.e.,l) k2
*1
1 +  , X  ¢.I  +ip,.)(I  p  k 2 )  C C,v  o-  C  *  pe.  az;  o 
P  (8,-i)
Re-arranging  terms  in  (A27):
(A28)  - - eq  {G  I  - a-,,,  +  0.  - p)  L  l  )
_T+ic.e+ axpo¢.,  aIp'V  1'  C>,C.-I  dIcl
____  CI,  C.)  (  - 2)  +  ,P
Substituting  (A26)  into  (A28):
(A29)  LHS  *  *  E 8p  e(Ie.i. e
In  order  to  obtain  real  rather  than  nominal  variables,  (A29)  can  be  re-
written  as  follows:
A30)  - (1+t.C)  (1+1C.C5 d  ej  age  t ,  ( 1+Od  )gt
(1+4  1t2)  (1.t;  ))  £  {-<4  (.  - a)
(l1a.7  e)  (1+Xe,  )P
Dividing  both  sides  of  (A30)  by  (1+no  t):
(A31) - t  e  *  a+e.l)a29  *  _±  8-  e *lfr,..v  ajt.  art'l  Io  l+.t,C+  I°.
6 ePpc.  ,1  [8,p  *+  jC*1,t-4)3- 56  -
(A31)  is  equal  to  equation  (27)  of  the  text. Furthermore,  if  In  (A23)  we
set  qpt  =  6t(qpt+ 11  Et{uct+il  = 0,  therefore  Tct  = et{Tct+i)  = 1,  then  (A23)
reduces  to  (A31).
Equation  (28)  of the  text  can  be  derived  in  an  analogous  way:  (A24)  is
differentiated  with  respect  to  Kkt+l,  and  the  derivative  is  set  equal  to  zero.
After  substituting  for  k2  from  (A26),  one  obtains  optimality  condition  (28)  of
the  text.
ADoendix  (5): Formulae  for  Price-elasticities  of  factor  demands,  and  for  the
elasticities  of  the  endosenous  variables  with  respect  to  changes
in  the  tax  allowances  for  investment  in  ohysical  and  knowleds
_apiWt.  and  with  respect  to  chances  in  the  tax  ce_dit  for
investment  in  physical  capital.  v 1 used  as  the  numiralre  input.
assumina  Partial  or  no  frward  shiftina  of  the  CIT.
We  define:  DENP  =(ap +  (Tct/et{Tct+i1)(1+rt't,i)aiprp  -app(1  8p)]
DENK  = [aKK  +  (TCt/et{TCt+11)(l+rt,t,1)atKtK  - aIK(K- 8P)J
ei1  - ta22()  d  [aT.  +  Srr(Yt)  + aPr(;VC) + a&,.r(Kk) + a,,(t)  +  a,.(Ir)  a  ar(4Z)  (F2)
+  (azp + a*r..)  apzp(R,e)  + a=p(Kkt)  + azm(x4)  + azrm(Yt)  + a()*
4f  t,t  (T.) /  a,T,,I))dMa/N
+  (a.  + ap=(4e)  a,(.r)  +  a=(.K)  c)  + a2(e)  + an,(Ye)  + a(t)
+ (lazxr + az=(Xj)  + ap=(Kp)  + axmr(Z*n)  + a,p,(X,,)  + azx(Yt)  + a=(O  I
(lt,ej  [zP,r(  Uax) 1 IDENK) (1/va¢)
+(a  r+  arr(re)  +  (Kp)  + axr(,e)  + arr(t)  + azr(Ip)  + ar(4r)]  (F.)
(U  .z)  [xp  ( ta)  I  /DEK)  (h/v,  )
+ ([a.,  + a,.(IX,)  + a,P(EJ,m) + a=(KXk)  + a,  .Xt4,)  + anr(Ye)  + a' (03
(1+rt,t.j)  (rPt(tRaX)  1 /D  )(1/vie)
• Qdr  + arr(r,)  +  p  a,(;p)  +  &r(KtI)  + a,(C)  +  a+(,)  +  m( I)  I (FM)
U +re  (,)  rp,  (tax)I/DEWP)(1  /v1t)  e  - l,  ,  + si- 57  -
e,2 - t-  (a22)  (w 2,)  + [ar  arr(Y.)  +  aprC;)  +  aw,(KkC) +  ar(t)  *a  e)  *a,(Ie)3  (F2)
- lazp  + azprp(Zp)  + ap,,(Rpe)  + axrp(AK,)  + azp,r(,k)  + a,,,(Y,)  + arr(  )]
- [amr + a  Z,(KIpe)  +  +az=(rkv)  +  a  ,(KkC)  + arprr(Ipv)  + a,j,(Ye)  + a*(t)
(1+4rt, tv1) ( Tetlect.o.3.))  arnXlENIIK  ( w2JlvI.)
el--  (a.  + a,(  t)  apzr(Kpt)  a  ax=(Kkt)  *  a 1 ,.(Irp)  +*ax"(Ye)  + a(t)
- (fa  + arr(  )  - ap((KZ,p) + axr(Kke)  + arr(t)  +  arpCr(Ip)  +  azxr(t)  I  (F(rr)
U +rt,  Ir)  t  , ( tax)  I  DM)(1  / v,,  )
ealp-  - tazp  + azPrp(Zpc)  4  apzP(Kpt)  + axCrp(kt)  + aZPzr(-rkd  + a2ZPr(yd  4  asPrW  I
(14zre,c.)  Irpg,(tax)  I /DEMP)(l/lve)
- {[ar  + aSr(Ye)  + apr(E;C)  + a&xr(Kte) + arr(t)  +  + aar(pr)I  (Fn,)
U1  +.rt,,  ).  ExPpg  ( t-ax)  I IDMf) (I1  / v3  c)
e  '{  a2a  - (a.2) (F 2)  + (am)2(Tc/eT(.,.))  (1er,.v.)/DENP
*  (aM)  2 (T'e/eg{(  T't)  (1 +XC,-)  IDESMKr)(2Jv2)
+ ([am= +  (an,))  (  (=)1  (  .e.i)/DENlR  [zpj(tax)/V2a]
+ (Car,  +  (an(Fzp)]  (1.rtt,. 1)/DENPI  rp,g(tax)  /v. 2 ]  E &2  +  *2P  +  ea]
-322 U  a2  +  (an)  (P2)  - (am)2 (Tg/e{(Tg.J})  (1 .r.  . 1 )/DEN
- (a.)  (TCS/ec{Tc.1))  (I+z  /,D.I  )  (Wzt/v2 2)
ex  - [ax  +  (ara)  (FP) ]  (I  r+,  .l,) IDMffl  X(rpx,  (tax)  /;Va]
S2a U  - (['m  +  (an)  (FrP) I  (1Ir  DW. 1 ) /)rp,  (Ca)  /v2a]
If  the assumption  of  full  short-run  forward  shifting  of  the  CIT  cannot  be
rejected  by  the  data  and  the  competing  model,  the  following  modifications  have
to  be  made  in  the  above  formulae:  Tct  = et(Tct+i}  =  1,  and  rppt(tax)  and
rpkt(tax)  have  to  be  replaced  by  rppt(fs)  and  rpkt(fs).- 58  -
For  the  Pakistani  textile  industry  Ikt  =  Kkt  =  rpkt(tax)  =  rpkt(fs)  =  0,
since  we  were  not  able  to  include  R&D  and  knowledge  capital  into  the  model  for
that  industry  because  of  data  limitations.
The  effect  of  a  change  in  the  tax  allowance  for  investment  in  knowledge  caRital
on  the  endogenous  variables  (not  relevant  for  the  Pakistani  textile  industry):
e-la  - {[at  + a, 1rt(Rj,,)  *  amx(XkC)  ^  a,r(Kikt)  +  arpI,I(IPt)  + ar 1,(Yt)  + azX*  t)  I
+  Ear  +  ar(Y.)  + apr(K,p)  + aK(Ktt)  +  arM  + aPr(IPd)  + aIrl(Ike)l  (FVr)
+  (afp  +  ar, 1 p(I,t)  + ap,2p(K,k)  )  +  aPzr(Ikkt+)  a1pr(Ye)  *  ar 1 (t)
(ar,p  1 -4p)  - a,,  - (T0 t/tE{TTt.j})  (1 +*r,.  e4i)  arpzx  /DENPt)
I(Ir+rt,t.)  (14gU+XC.C)eC{pktC.}(uct)  (qkc)]  /  (DEKt)  (Ge{Tc,.,))  (v 1 ,).
020K 'a-  +  (an?) (Fm)  *  (a,p  (ax,p(1-6p)  - a,,  - (TC/eeTct,lJ)  (1+¢,  .1)  zpaz/DENPWt
I (  (1i)  1 /  [  (DEN}Ke) (6e{Tae  u  k)  (V2t)  1
on=7S  1 (3  +I t, t-d)  fe@toP-LJ  ( Ull)  (qkt)  /  (DMt)  (eetITct-l})  (.-te)]
envcr  [a., p1l-p)  - ap,, - UTts{¢vl  lr.l  azlpnr
- !(TeC/6e(T,e 4i))  ( 1 +r¢, c. 1 )  (ans,)  (P:lr) ]
I('+I,  Od)et'Pkt.l}(Urc)  (qkt)  I/[  (DMWI)  (DET,)  (Yet)t.L})  (Ip,)
e=,  i Pj  +  (Frp)  laxrp(1-6p)  - aprf(c/eTt}  (l+rz,t.,)ap,,]/DEMP.)
C  U +it , ..  ) eeIpft.,I ( u,,)  (  qj,)  I  (DEMeK)  Ce{TeX)  vY)  I
The  effect  of  a  chanse  in  the  tax  allowance  for  investment  in  phvsical  capital
on  the  endogenous  variables  (relevant  only  for  Turkey):
elop  - ((a rp t  azP,P(Z,c)  +  ap,:(KV)  + 4jxp(Kkt)  *  a.rPZr(1 rk)  4a 1 ,(4)  *Prt  I
+  far  + ay(Ye)  +apr(K4t)  + axr(Kkt)  + arpr(ive)  + a=(Ikt)  +  aye(v)]  (Fz,)
+  (a,,  a,P(r(Kp)  +  af,.r(Xke)  t  a,(Kkd)  + a+,(I,)  + ar,(Yt)  +  a(W
lapx(1-6 8 k)  - apx  - (T,e/eI{T,,,})  (*Z.e,ct,)azpzr  I/D  DWt)
(lI+e, c .)  6t(P,e,i)  (u)  (qpe)J  /  (DEMP,) (e¢(T 0>.11)  (v,)J- 59  -
2Qp  (azp2 + (a..)  (FP.)  +  (ar[a,apzr(1- 8k)  - apx - (Tae/Z(Tc,iTa) (1+z.pzj) arJ, 1 ,  /DENI4 
I ((I+1 e)  eu)  9pc+l  ( Uce) (qpt)  I / ((DEPe)  (6e2Tet.l))  (v2e) 1
e,,  I  - a,,  - (TC/e£T 0 C.1))  (1*+z,,t 1)a 11 z, 1
- (Tac/6c(Tce.i))  (1+re.l)  (atzr) (FIP)]
l (itetl)  E,(.Pl. 1 (U0c)  (%pc)3/Cl(DNt)  (DENPt)  (eclTec 0 .1)  (1 tk)]
e  C(1  +I  p,,C  Gel{vp.l  (uct)  (q,/)  I(/(DMNPr(  ) (ze,)]
e,mp  (  PFr, +  (Fzr)  Ca,.r(1- 8 k)  - ap,  - ((tI/e(T.))  (  .)  azrl  /DEPJI4)
I (1+iee:.)6  p,PP.i(U.  e)  (Qu,,  )  (  /1 (DEIPe) (  E  T.))  (Ye)  I
The effect  of  a  changa in the  tax  credit  for  investment  in phvsical  capital  on
the  endogenous  variables  (relevant  only for  Pakistan):
e,L  =  -ta 1,p+amrp 1 (Irpe)  +apzp(K'p)  +a,Ip(Kke)  +aWp7J(IkC)  +am(Y)  +azp(t)]
+  tay4an(  Ye)  4.a,y(Kpe)  +axr(Kke)  +ap(Ipr)  aW(Ik)  +a(t)]  (F)
+  (anR+apzr(;p)  +aI  (rkt)  +a,z.,(Kke)  +.a 1 p 1 R(IX)  +any(Yc)  +a=(t)]
[a,.(l  -* 6 ,)  - ap,  - (T1c/et(T.. 1 })  (1 +.r,  t.1) azpn]  /DI1M7K
t (1Iie.e+i)E{Ppe.i}(1pe)  ] /  [ (DMVPt)  (et(T¢t. 1})  (v1t)]
e,2,  a{a2  +  (an2)  (Fzp)
+  (a12)  . a,)  -- 8k)  - a,,  - (Tcv/et{T(7l 0 ))  (1+rte,e+)arPAr]  /DENMK)
((14i  e+  )  ieJ{Pp,e+,}(m'p)  ] /  [ (DENFP) (e0(T7cr,})  (v2d)]
eD,p  Ea,pm(1-6, 8 k)  - ap,  - (T0r/et(T 0 t. 1J)  (14.re,  .1 ) a 1 ,1 ,
(Tct1/t{Tct+.}) (1 +zre,  .,)  (a=)  (Frp)]
C(1eiee,  t)e+Apl)  .(m..)  ] /  ( (DE  cKe)  (DENPC)  (et(Tct-l))  (IZk)]
(loit ee  )eePP,.lp(mp¢)]  /  [(DENP,) (CtTec.1})  (I,e)  ]- 60  -
ewX9 = (Fxp  + (F=)  (aprj(l  -8k)  - ap,  - Ttc{¢v)(l+,  l  aP$/D  }
+it,  ... ) e,.Pp,,,  p)  ] /  E  (DMvp)  (eJ{To,, 1)) (Ye)]
As previously  mentioned,  for the textile  industry  the  model  did not
include  R&D  expenditures  or  knowledge  capital.  Therefore  eIKMp  does  not  apply
for  that  industry,  and  DENKt  as  well  as  all  the  terms  involving  Ikt  and  Kkt  are
equal  to  zero  in  the  remaining  formulae  above.
If  the  assumption  of  complete  short-run  forward  shifting  of  the  CIT  could
not  be  rejected  by  the  data  and  the  competing  hypothesis  of  partial  or  no  tax
shifting,  the  following  conditions  would  hold:
eIQK  e,QK  =  eIKQK  ~ efpQg  =  eyQ  0,
eljp  -eQp =  ekp  =  elpgp  = eyQp  =  0,  and
eiNp  el,p = eEKNp  =  e,pp  =  eMp  - 0.
In other  words,  neither  the  tax  allowance  for  investment  in  physical  capital,  nor
the  tax  allowance  for  R&D  expenditures,  nor  the  tax  credit  for  investment  in
physical  capital,  would  have  any  effect  on  the  endogenous  variables  of  the  model.
The reason  for  this is  that  under  the  assumption  of full  tax shifting  the
allowance  for  R&D  expenditures  does  not  occur  in  rpkt(fs),  the  rental  price  of
the  services  from  knowledge  capital  [see  equation  (28)  in  the  text].  Neither  do
the  tax allowance  and the tax credit  for physical  investment  occur in  the
expression  for  rppt(fs),  the  rental  price  of  the  services  from  physical  capital
[see  equation  (27)  of  the  text].- 61 -
ADoendix  (6):  SRecificatlon  of functional  form.  method  of  estimation.  and
non-nested  hyoRthesis  tests
Following  the example  of Pindyck  and  Rotemberg  (1983),  the optimality
conditions  derived  in  sections  (3.2)  and  (3.3)  above  can  be  used  as  alternative
estimating  equations  for  investment  Ipt  and  Ikt. The  estimating  equetions  for
the  variable  inputs  can  be  obtained  from  Shephard's  Lemma  [see  R.W.  Shephard
(1953)  and  (1970)].
The  variable  cost  function  gt  is  approximated  by  a  quadratic  normalized
variable  cost function,  which provides  a second-order  approximation  to an
arbitrary  normalized  variable  cost  function.  Using  a  quadratic  specification  has
the  advantage  that  the  first-order  conditions  can  be  solved  explicitly  for  the
optimal  rates  of investment. Using  the quadratic  functional  form has the
disadvantage,  however,  that  the  quadratic  is not invariant  to the  choice  of
num6raire  input.  Therefore  the  model  has  to  be  estimated  twice,  using  labour  and
materials  as  the  numbraire  input  in  turn.
The  quadratic  normalized  variable  cost  function  with  the  input  price  W1t
as  the  num4raire  is  specified  as  follows:
(A32)  Ge/Wt  - Vl  +  (w2 ) v2-  g  (wC,  j,t,  Xf,  r,  IkC'  Y4,  el
- a.  +  *a 2(wi)  + a,(Kp)  + a,(X3k)  + azp.(Ip)  + arr(I4t)  + ar(4e)
•  at(t)  + 0.5(a  (jro) 2 +  aX 1,(KIM)2 + azp,,p(IPC)3 + a*(Irk)2
•  arr(e)2  + a,,(t) 3 + a2,3|(W)'I  *  a,,(LE,)  (wv2)  + apj(R(K)  (KkC)
•  aPZP(K;C)  (I,C)  +  a8.(0r)  (Ike)  4  i1P 1 (A)  (re)  + &Pt(KC)  (t)
*  aX(kt))  (V2C)  4  a=(Kkd  (Xpt)  * aX(Rk)  (Ike)  +  aSJr(R,)  (4)
*  4t(Kkt)  (t)  + a*z( 1p)  (war)  + azpzrn(Ie)  (Crk) + aypr(xp)  (4t)
*  ar,e((Ip)  (c)  + a(.rk.e)  (w2C)  + a=f (4xI) (Y4)  + a.,(re)  (t)
*  a(Y)  (w2)  + aTV(Y)  (t)  + a(tt  (w 2 s)d 
where  w2t =  W2t/W 1t,  and  the  a's  are  coefficients  to  be  estimated.
The  demand  for  input  v2t  is  given  by  Shephard's  Lemma  as  .9gt/#3w 2t.  An- 62  -
additive  disturbance  term  allows  for  errors  in  optimization  and/or  measurement
and  for  omitted  variables:
(A33)  v2,  n  a 2 +  aa2(d  ,3 +  apM(Kpg)  + a,=(Kke)  +  a1p2(I;p,)  +  adm(It,)
+ a,t(Yt)  + a4,(t)  +  u2C
The  demand  for  input  vlt  can  be  obtained  from  the  normal  i  zed  variable  cost
function  as  follows:
(A34)  VIC  - (G,fW 1 t)  - (w2 t)  (vaC)
=  a.  +  ajp(R,)  + aj(Kke)  + a,p*(pt)  + atr(e)  + a*(0
+  0.5  iad(RPC)2  + a*(tt)2  + aZPZP(XPC)2  + A',,(I*,)2  * &rr(yC)2
+  at  (e) 2 - a  (wc  2]) 2 +  px(Kpt)  (Ktt)  + a.,p(,K)  (X,t)
+  a,r:(Rje)  (4fk)  + a,yr(KJe)  (Ye)  + ape(rpj)  (t)  + ar,(RK¢)  (I,e)
+  *W( 4 g)  (Iek)  + atr(Kkt)  (YC)  + ajm(Kn)  (t)  + a=(Io)  (Itk)
+  azpr(I,)  (Yt)  + a,,,(Ipc)  (t)  +  .arZZ(Ikt) (Ye)  *  arze(IL,)  (t)
4  87c(Ye) (t)  4  Lta
Under  the  assumption  of  perfect  competition  the  estimating  equation  for
output  is  a  linear  approximation  of  equation  (13).  Only  the  observable  variables
are  used  as  explanatory  variables,  and  the  F's  are  coefficients  to  be  estimated:
(A35)  rt  =  F  pr(P,,/Wt,.)  +  F2(w2C)  +  Fp(E,p)  +  Fx(Kk,)  - 4p(xp,)
+  PZU(IX))  + F,(t)  4  U*
Under  the  assumption  that  the  dominant  firm  (group  of  firms)  has  market
power  and  reduces  its  output  in  response  to  a  change  in  the  CIT,  the  estimating
equation  for  output  is  a  linear  approximation  of  equation  (25),  again  with  only
the  observable  variables  used  as  explanatory  variables:
(A36)  Y-  F-o  F:(X(/Wtl)  + Fm(PyCt/Wj)  + F2(WR2)  +  F,p(Rj,)  + F(K)
* Fzp(Ioc)  + Fr.r(kCI  +  Fa(cd)  + FeW)  + uy
Estimating  equations  for  gross  investment  Ipt  and  Ikt  can  be  obtained  from- 63 -
equilibrium  conditions  (15)  and  (16)  or (27)  and  (28),  according  to  which  the
expected  net  marginal  benefits  from  physical  and  knowledge  capital  have  to  be
equal  to  the  rental  price  of  capital  services.  Kpt  and  Kkt,  the  capital  stocks
at  the  beginning  of  period  t,  are  given  to  the  firm,  but  the  next  period's
capital  stocks  are  determined  by  optimality  conditions  (15),  (16)  or  (27),  (28).
Therefore  Ipt  i :  6pKpt  +  (Kpt+l  - Kpt)J  and  Ikt  I  = 6kKkt  +  (Kkt+1  - Kkt)]  are
endogenous  variables.  In  order  to  solve  (15),  (16)  or  (27),  (28)  for  the  optimal
rates  of  investment,  the  following  derivatives  are  required:
(A37)  ag9.e/aiRje.  '  ap + app(Nn,,1)  +  a,(KkC 1 )  + aP2(M2Ve)  + aP8p(Yr)
+  aPw(I1)  * aP8f(IC-3)  + ape(tCl)
(A38)  ag/IOl,x ap  + arpzp(Ipe)  + aWZPm(Ixk)  + azp,,(w)  +  ap,,(*.)
*  ap(K&v)  + azpr(Ye)  + azp(t)
(A39)  age.11aXpe.  - azp + aZ,(I,-p)  + azvr(I.Wat+l) 
+  a,2,p(.jrj 1 )  +  azp  r  *  a(Yr, 1)  + a*ft(t+l)
(A40)  agt.3/cKkr.j-  ax  + a=(KC&..)  + apr(O;e.i)  + ax2(war.*) + af(Y,t. 1)
+  a,jP(Ir,e.^)  +  ax(t+1)
(A41)  age/ar.  -a  z  + ad,=(Ike)  + a7,2,(Irp)  + arjm(w 2 i)  + ap,(Jp)
+  axM(Kk)  + azw(Ye)  + a.(t 1 4
(A42)  8ge.1/8,6. 1 - aa,  + a(e  4  8A(Ipv.i)  + a(a(c,r)
+  ap**;.j)  + am(RK4 .j)  + ar(Ye,j)  + anr(t+l)
Under  the  assumption  that  there  is  partial  or  no  short-run  forward  shifting
of  the  CIT  we  substitute  (A37)  to (A39)  into  optimality  condition  (15),  replace
Kpt+l  by (Ipt  +  Kpt  - apKpt)  and  Kkt+1  by  (Ikt  +  Kkt  - 8kKkt),  solve  for  gross
investment  in  physical  capital  Ipt,  and  add  an  error  term:- 64  -
(A43'  I ,,  (2.1 (ap,  +  (1zrT,cT.)a 1p,p - an1p(I.-B)  I
(1 -6p) a,p  - ap  - (7T,t/ee(TO, 1)) (1  e.,  t.1) azp
-(TCt/6C{Tce.)) (i+zV.C.3 1 )a1 (wa)  [(+  1-8,)  a1 - a,2)  eeAw2V.j)
+  [aPzP(1-6V)2  - a,,(1-3.)  - (TcK/ep{Toc,i))  (1+ze,)a,l,)  (Rh)
+  ta,crpU-8p)  aj- 8 k)  - jaP(1-b)  (TTC/Et(T 0tv.))  (1  tt,tdl)^TP]  (Kk)
+  (d,.rA(l-8,)  - ap,  - (T,,/e,{T,+ 1,)) (1.r¢,¢. 1 )a1,,  (Ikc)
- (TcefEe{TOt,))  (1+te,t.,)  aa,,(Yr)  +  ((-8,)  azpr  - ap.l  )e.{Ye,i)
-(T.ClCtkt-ll))  (I +.r,,  .e  3)^pt  ( s)  +  I (1 -8,)  arpt:  - ap,  I  ( t+1)
+  [(1-6P)aC 1 P,  - ap,pl  4etI.j  +  (1-8,p)arpzr  - a,rj,  eet(tI.1)
- (1+XC,C.i)Ip,pC(tax))  )+  u*pe
Equation  (A43)  shows  that  investment  in  physical  capital  Ipt  depends  not
only  on the stock  of physical  capital  Kpt and on next period's  expected
investment  et[Ipt+ll,  but  also  on the  stock  of knowledge  capital  Kkt,  on  R&D
expenditures  for  the  current  period,  and  on  Et{Ikt+ll,  the  amount  of  R&D  expected
for  the  next  period.
Similarly,  under  the  same  assumption  of  partial  or  no  short-run  forward
shifting  we substitute  (A40)  to (A42)  into  optimality  condition  (16),  again
substituting  CIpt  +  Kpt  - apKpt]  for  Kpt+l  and [Ikt  +  Kkt  - 8kKkt]  for  Kkt+1-
This  time  we  solve  ':cr  R&D  expenditures  Ikt,  and  again  add  an  error  term:
(A44)  Ze  [  (I/  (Xam  (T  E,1Tt.J)  (1z.  c,j)  azxrj - a,.(1-6k)  )
{ (1-fik) a.r  - a,  - (Te/e{Te.))  ( l+re  .L) aw
(Tct/eez,, 1J)  (1 r¢,i)am(v2)  +  (1k-3j)a,;  - aflal  'e{VW2e,)
•  [a(1-6Ok)  - a,,)(1-  a)  (1T6/e¢{Tm  1)  (z+x  e. 1 L)  ap]  (zKk)
+  [aprj-(1-hk)  - a,,I-  - (Tc,/ee{T(,vi))  (lfrc,.l)apaK  ('t)
- (Ta/eefta..1))  (34rc)t,j)aa=r(Ye)  *  t (1-8j)azv  - axr.  eefte.i
- (Tct/etSTet,1 ))(1+zX.ei)azfg(t)  +  ((1-hJ)az  -a,.]  (t+l)
+  (1 -Ok) a==  - a.,]  eC(tIc,j  +  I (1-6k)affl,  - a=  I e4rpC.P)
- (l+reen)XPkg(tax))  +  Una
Equation  (A44)  shows  that  R&D  expenditures  Ikt  depend  not  only  on  the
stock  of knowledge  capital  Kkt  and  on  next  period's  expected  R&D  expenditures65
Et{Ikt+l, but also  on the stock  of physical  capital  Kpt,  on current  gross
investment  in  physical  capital  Ipt,  and  on  et(Ipt+1,  the  amount  of investment
in  physical  capital  expected  for  the  next  period.  Due  to  a  limited  sample  size
we  were  not  able  to  include  equation  (A44)  in  the  system  of  equations  for  the
Pakistani  textile  industry.
Next  we  show  what  the  twc  estimating  equations  for  investment  in  phys-ical
and  knowledge  capital  would  be  in  an  industry  with  unexerted  market  power,  if  the
firms  succeeded  in shifting  the CIT forward  completely. To this end we
substitute  (A37)  to  (A39)  into  first-order  condition  (27),  and (A40)  to (A42)
into  optimality  condition  (28).  First-order  conditions  (27)  and  (28)  differ  from
conditions  (15)  and  (16)  only  in  two  respects:  The  factor  (Tct/6t{Tct+il  is
missing  from  the  second  term  on the left-hand  side  of (27)  and  (2&),  and  the
right-hand  sides  of  (27)  and  (28)  represent  the  rental  prices  of  capital  services
under  the  assumption  of  full  shifting,  while  the  right-hand  sides  of  (15)  and
(16)  represent  the  rental  prices  of  capital  services  in  the  absence  of full
short-run  shifting  of  the  CIT. Therefore  the  following  alternative  estimating
equations  for  investment  in  physical  capital  Ipt and  for  R&D  expenditures  Ikt
can  also  be  obtained  from  (A43)  and  (A44)  by  setting  Tct  = t{Tct+l}  =  1,  and  by
replacing  rppt(tax)  with  rppt(fs)  and  rpkt(tax)  with  rpkt(fs):
(A5pe  5El/  (amp  +  U  .r¢,, .,,)arp>zp  - aVZ.  rp(l4))  - aD,  - (ap  +r-)
- (1+re,,e-)arn(w2.)  +  *(1-6)  ar  - an2]  6{WU-1)
t  (a, 1,(1-  )a_  - - (i+Ze,'e.)aPZVp  (RJc,)
•  ta,p{(1-6p)  (l-ok)  - &aP(1- 8 )  - (1+r1,. 1 )aXP1  (Kku)
+  rdnp(*-a.,  - aPX-  (1+rV,t+,)aYP|r1  (Xk,)
- (loret,)axpr(Yt)  +  - ap,l  ee{Ye+1)
C  L+.r.. .1) azpet)  +  ( (1-,P) az;,e  a-  It (C+l)
+  [((-6,)  arpp  - amp  e{Ip  +  ((-6p)-arp,)  - ap,r  ec(r
- (.+rZg,.i)  P,tpr(fB) ?+  u*e- 66  -
(A46) 
1kc  =1/(a,*  +  (l *re, .1)az,uK  - a=K(1- 8 k)  )I  (  - aK  - (v*k  a,,
- (Xt,t-1)aX2W29)  +  I(--6k)arx2  - ana]  Ig{W2e.l)
+  [aJZX(-1 8 k)3 - a=(1- 8 k)  - (1+zt.C 1)aU,J  (Kt.)
(aPZ,(i-k)  (1-p)  - (ap-  (1+zrt,t)aAEK  (I,p)
+  (ap,,(1- 6.)  - a,,  - (1*rt,e,)aSP=]  (ID,)
- (1+xr,  4, 1)arKy(Ye) +  [(1-6t)axxwr  - axr]  er(Ye# 1)
- (1*re,  )  a~i.jt)  +*  (H1-8f)a ,ax - a,,]  (t  l)
+  ((1-,k)  ar 1 a1 - a,=,]  et(Ik,tl)  +  I (1 -6 8)  arPX  - ajap  I ee{I,p}
- (1 +Zrt,  C.)  1ZPkt  (fS)  )  + Urft
(Due  to  data  limitations  (A46)  was  omitted  from  tne  system  of  equations
we  estimated  for  the  Pakistani  textile  industry.]
(A33)  to (A35),  (A43)  and (A44)  form  the  system  of five  simultaneous
equations  which  is  estimated  under  the  assumption  of  perfect  competition,  hence
no  short-run  forward  shifting  of  the  CIT.  For  the  competing  assumption  of  market
power  and  full  tax  shifting  the  relevant  system  of  equations  consists  of (A33),
(A34),  (A36),  (A45)  and (A46). Since the  endogenous  variables  output  and
investment  occur  as  explanatory  variables  in  the  other  equations,  the  systems
have  to  be  estimated  with  non-linear  three-stage  least  squares  [3SLS]  in  order
to  avoid  simultaneous  equations  bias.  The  following  exogenous  variables  are  used
as  the  instruments  under  the  assumption  that  there  is  no  full  tax  shifting:  Kpt,
Kkt,  t,  (Pyt/Wit)  (Pyt  = nominal  price  of  output],  w2t 1= W2t/W 1t = real  price
of  variable  input  2],  etfw2t+1},  rppt(tax),  and  rpkt(tax).  Under  the  assumption
that  the  CIT  is  fully  shifted  forward  in  the  short  run,  the  exogenous  variables
Kpt,  Kkt,  t, (Xt/Wlt)  [Xt  - current  dollar  GNP  or GDP],  (Pyst/Wit)  iPyst  =
nominal  price  of  substitute  products],  w2t,  6tfw2t+l),  Tct  [  = 1  - uct,  where  uct
is  the  statutory  rate  of  the  CIT],  Et{Tct+il,  rppt(fs)  and  rpkt(fs)  are  used  as
the instruments.  Both  systems  have  to  be estimated  twice,  using  labour  and
materials  as  the  numdraire  input  in  turn.- 67 -
The  question  arises  how  to  obtain  the  expected  values  of  future  exogenous
and  endogenous  variables.  It  would  be  possible  to  obtain  the  expected  values  of
the exogenous  variables  w2t+1, Tct+i, bt+i, Ppt+l and Pkt+1'  given the
information  set gt' by determining  the variables  which  Granger-cause  these
exogenous  variables.  Granger  causality  is  defined  as  follows:  "We  say  that  Yt
is  causing  Xt  if  we  are  better  abla  to  predict  Xt  using  all  available  information
than  if  the information  apart  from  Yt had  beer  used."  [Granger  (1969:428)].
Having  obtained  the  Granger-causing  variables,  one  could  then  assume  that  they
form  the  information  set  Ot. The  choice  of  Granger-causing  variables  is  bound
to  be  somewhat  arbitrary,  however,  so  that  different  researchers  would  not  use
the  same  variables.  The  method  used  by  Kennan  (1979)  does  not  suffer  from  this
drawback.  His  argument  can  be  summarized  as  follows:  Under  the  assumption  of
rational  expectations,  economic  agents  use  all  the  relevant  information  available
to  them  at  time  t,  in  order  to  make  unbiased  forecasts  of  the  future  values  of
certain  stochastic  variables.  Therefore  the  subsequent  realizations  of  these
stochastic  variables  can  be  used  as  "backcasts"  of  the  unobservable  expectations,
and  expected  values  can  be  replaced  by  their  subsequently  realized  actual  values
[J.  Kennan  (1979),  at  pp.  1444,  1447,  1453].
After  replacing  the  expected  values  of the  exogenous  variables  by their
subsequent  realizations,  there  are  still  the  expected  values  of  the  endogenous
variables  to  be  dealt  with  in  the  estimating  equations  for  investment  in  physical
capital  [Ipt]  and  in  knowledge  capital  (R&D  expenditures  Ikt]: the  expected
values  of  Yt+1,  1pt+l  and  Ikt+1l  given  Ot.  These  endogenous  variables  can  be
handled  by  using the definition  of  rational  expectations  due tc Muth:
"Expectations,  since  they are informed  predictions  of future  events,  are
essentially  the  same  as  the  predictions  of  the  relevant  economic  theory."  [J.F.- 68 -
Muth  (1961:316)]  The relevant  economic  theory  for  obtaining  the endogenous
variables  would  be  the  three  estimating  equations  for  output,  physical  investment
and  R&D  expenditures,  all  of  them  shifted  forward  by  one  time  period.  But  since
6t[Yt+i} occurs  as  an  explanatory  variable  in  the  equations  for  investment,  and
Gt{Ipt+ll  and  Et{Ikt+l)  occur  in  the  equation  for  next  period's  output,  all  of
them  have  to be  replaced  by  instruments  to  avoid  simultaneous  equations  bias.
Regressing  Yt+1  Ipt+1  and  Ikt+1  on the  exogenous  variables  of the  next  time
period  provides  the instruments  for  et(Yt+.},  et[Ipt+,l  and et{Ikt+1}. The
instruments  are  those  listed  above  for  the  two  competing  assumptions  about  the
absence  or  presence  of  complete  tax  shifting,  except  that  they  are  all  moved
forward  by  one  time  period.
In  order  to  outline  the  non-nested  hypothesis  tests  [see  J.G.  MacKinnon
(1983)]  whose  results  are  reported  in  section  (4)  of  the  text,  it  is  useful  to
re-write  the  two  systems  of  equations  more  compactly.  Under  the  twin  assumptions
of  unexerted  market  power  and  full  short-run  forward  shifting  of  the  CIT  the
system  of  equations  can  be  written  as  follows:
(A47)  zp,  It,  Lt.  Mt, Yr3e  -v  f(0  zppe (fs),  zrpkt(fs)  , py,,,  x8)  + U2e
ufflt  - NOe)
where  a  is  the  vector  of regression  coefficients  obtained  by  estimating  the
system  (A47),  and  in  this  context  Q  stands  for  the  variance-covariance  matrix  of
the  system  of  five  equations.  Because  of  data  limitations  we  estimated  a system
of only  four  equations  for the Pakistani  textile  industry. Therefore  the
equation  for  R&D  expenditures  Ikt  has  to  be  omitted  from  (A47)  above,  and  from
(A481  to  (A50)  below.
Assuming  perfect  competition  and  the  absence  of  complete  short-run  forward
shifting,  the  system  of  equations  can  be  written  as:- 69  -
(A48)  [Cpg, .Ikt,  Lt.  Me,Y]/  Fjc  (T  zPpe(etx)i  rPkCe(tax),  Py)  +  Uc  ,
Ujye  '  N(ogjm)g
where  t  is  the  vector  of regression  coefficients  obtained  by  estimating  (A48).
Testing  the  null-hypothesis  that  complete  short-run  forward  shifting  of
the  CIT is present  against  the  alternative  hypotr,esis  that  full  shifting  is
absent  involves  estimating  the  following  composite  model:
(A49)  [Ip,t.I~,pft  LcMc, Ye]  (1-S)  tCfc(pt,Zp,(f8)  ,rpte(f)  yt  (S) (Pjt)  +  ufe'
ufet - N(OirOt')
where Pjc  (f,  xpp,  tax)  ,  r;k  (tax)  ,  pye)  are  the  fitted  values  of  the
dependent  variables  obtained  by  estimating  the  system  of  equations  (A48).  The
test  statistic  is  the  value  of  t  for  the  estimate  of  the  coefficient  S.
Testing  the  null-hypothesis  that  complete  tax  shifting  is  absent  against
the  cIternative  hypothesis  that  it  is  present  involves  estimating  the  following
composite  model:
(A50)  tI>e,Xts#  w,tMr  (Y.-Q)(I  [P,.(v,zp.(x).z  (tax)pp,py)  * (Q) (t.)  *
U  -'. ^  N  (0,  0,,)
where  e  =  f  rp 1,,(fs)  ,  rp,,(fs)  * py..,  X.)  are  the  fitted  values  of
the  dependent  variables  from  estimating  the  system  of  equations  (A47).  The  test
statistic  is  the  value  of  t for  the  estimate  of  the  coefficient  Q.
The  model  was  estimated  with  TSP.- 70 -
Appendix  (7): Data  description  and  construction  of  the  variables
For  Pakistan  most  of  the  data  used  in  this  study  were  obtained  from  various
issues  of the CENSUS  OF MANUFACTURING  INDUSTRIES  and the ECONOMIC  SURVEY
STATISTICAL  SUPPLEMENT:  1987-88,  and  cover  the  1966-1985  period.  For  Turkey  most
of  the  data  came  from  the  STATISTICAL  YEARBOOK  and  from  unpublished  tax  data.
They  cover  the  period  from  1973  to  1986.  The  construction  of  the  variables  was
done  as  follows:
Land  and  Buildings:  The  quantities  of  land  and  buildings  were  constructed
by  dividing  the  stocks  by  the  investment  deflator.  The  stocks  were  constructed
by  employing  the  perpetual  inventory  method,  with  the  depreciation  rate  set  equal
to  0.05. As  starting  values  for  the  stocks  we  used  the  1956  end-of-year  book
values  of  land  and  buildings.
Machinery  and  Equipment:  The  quantities  of  machinery  and  equipment  were
constructed  in  the  same  way  as  those  of  the  land-and-buildings  variable,  except
that  a  depreciation  rate  of  0.10  was  used.
Rental  prices  of the  services  from  physical  and  knowledge  capital:  The
rignt-hand  sides  of equations  (15)  and (16),  and the right-hand  sides  of
equations  (27)  and  (28)  were  used  to  calculate  the  user  costs  of  capital.
Labour:  The  quantity  of  labour  was  measured  as  the  total  number  of  days
worked  during  the  year  for  Pakistan,  and  as the  average  number  of employees
during  the  year  for  Turkey.  The  price  index  was  constructed  by  dividing  total
employment  cost  during  the  year  by  the  number  of  days  worked  (Pakistan)  or  the
number  of  employees  (Turkey).
Intermediate  inputs:  For  Pakistan  intermediate  inputs  include  electricity,
petroleum  fuel,  natural  gas,  and  imported  and  domestically  produced  miscellaneous
materials.  Intermediate  inputs  for  Turkey  include  raw  materials,  components,
containers,  fuel  and  electricity.  Aggregate  price  and  quantity  indices  were
constructed  from  these  components  by  using  the  Tornqvist  approximation  of the
Divisia  index.
Output.  The  quantity  of  output  was  constructed  by  dividing  the  total  value
o'f  output  by the  manufacturing  output  deflator.Policy  Research Working  Paper  Series
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